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vABSTRACT 
The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has an instituted safety program that utilizes 
a generic risk assessment technique called the Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW), 
which has several shortcomings. They include vague categorization to guide task 
decomposition, a generic 5-M factor hazard identification method, and insufficient 
resolution to prioritize risks. This thesis studies two alternative risk 
assessment techniques: Process Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis 
(PFMECA) and Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART), 
to determine their suitability for use by SAF. To compare the three techniques 
in assessing the risks associated with a specific work process, this thesis uses the 
activity of replacing the track on one side of an armored fighting vehicle in the 
workshop. Both PFMECA and HEART analyses were more effective than RAW. In 
addition, PFMECA and HEART were equally effective at identifying the top risks, 
as shown through side-by-side comparison and a case study. Furthermore, SAF 
personnel can easily learn and apply the PFMECA technique because SAF is already 
using a similar technique, the FMECA technique, for technical system analysis.   
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Safety is a very important aspect of any organization because adherence to safety 
preserves lives, maintains confidence, and boosts productivity. Yet, injuries are not 
completely avoidable. Therefore, every organization and workplace should have a safety 
program to minimize the occurrence of injuries. The safety program should include an 
analysis of potential injuries and associated risk assessments of those injuries. 
The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has an instituted safety program that utilizes 
a generic risk assessment method involving the 5-M (Mission, Man, Machine, Medium 
and Management) factor method and determines severity, likelihood, and overall level of 
risk through risk matrices that are similar to the ones depicted in United States Navy 
operation risk management OPNAV Instruction 3500.39C (Department of the Navy 
2010). The Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW) contains the results of the risk 
assessment.  
There are several shortcomings with the current RAW technique. The 
categorization of the preparation, execution, and recovery phases guides the task 
decomposition process. However, this categorization method is too generic and vague, 
and results in varying degrees of completeness and thoroughness in the task 
decomposition. Furthermore, the current hazard identification analysis using the 
preliminary hazard listing and 5-M method for framing the risk assessment allows for 
wide interpretation as to what responses are comprehensive enough to enable the user to 
appreciate fully the conduct of the activity and the risks associated with each activity. 
This is especially so for officers who may not yet be familiar with the system. Finally, the 
current risk assessment technique may not provide the sufficient resolution to prioritize 
one risk over the other. This may result in significant risks to be obscured from the 
planner.  
This thesis conducts a proof-of-concept study applying an alternative and well-
practiced systems safety method, the Process Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis (PFMECA) and a well-known Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) method, the 
xvi
Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART), to identify hazards in 
SAF work processes. This thesis explores alternate methods that SAF could use to 
evaluate potential hazards. PFMECA is a slightly modified version of the Failure Modes, 
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) method.  
For the purpose of analysis, this thesis selected a particular system—a work 
process—in the SAF. This work process is the activity of replacing one side of an 
armored fighting vehicle (AFV) track in the workshop. This work process was broken 
down into its constituent elements via a Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD). 
Thereafter, the author conducted a PFMECA analysis for the work process to determine 
the riskiest tasks. In addition, the author analyzed the same work process using the 
HEART technique and compared the results of both analyses against the RAW results.  
Both PFMECA and HEART methods were more effective than RAW in hazard 
risk analysis. In addition, both PFMECA and HEART were equally effective at 
identifying the top risks. However, PFMECA would be a more useful tool for SAF 
because the SAF is already using the FMECA technique, a similar variant of PFMECA 
technique. Therefore, the organization would be familiar with the use of the tool. This 
would reduce the learning curve for the organization to begin using this tool and then to 
expand its implementation to other safety related areas. In addition, commonality across 
tools would keep administration efforts down and achieve ease of integration, if needed. 
The layout of the PFMECA template and its intuitive, logical flow make the 
PFMECA technique easy to learn and apply. It is also easy to trace the logic for deriving 
the results of the PFMECA analysis. The reports generated using PFMECA have a 
logical flow, which allows drafted junior officers, hereafter referred to as junior officers, 
to fully understand the operational activity and the risks involved.  
On the other hand, the HEART technique requires additional material like a 
Generic Task List and Error Producing Conditions (EPC) reference list to facilitate 
hazard analysis. The added requirement to understand the material may make the 
HEART technique difficult to implement in the SAF, given the tight training schedules 
 xvii
and the frequent rotation of new leaders due to drafting requirements. As such, the junior 
officers would have additional barriers to overcome when using this tool.   
PFMECA is also a flexible tool that could be adapted and applied either to 
technical systems or to work processes. Many SAF operational activities include the 
close interaction of technical systems with human operators. While this thesis focused on 
the human aspect of the operational activity, it is difficult to separate the technical 
systems from the human activities. Since HEART analysis is not suitable to analyze 
technical systems, PFMECA is preferred to achieve commonality of tools and thus 
promote easier integration of hazard analysis for operational activities requiring close 
interaction of technical systems with human operators. 
It is recommended that SAF embark on a one-time effort to select operations and 
work processes that are generally static. This could be maintenance work processes. The 
SAF could carry out a one-time risk assessment using PFMECA technique through teams 
of subject matter experts and promulgate the results as training safety regulations for all 
to reference. SAF leaders could continue to use the Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW) 
technique as a secondary assessment method for leaders to assess the situation on the 
ground, right before the execution of work processes, for any new hazards that may arise 
from changing conditions. 
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Safety is a very important aspect of any organization, because adherence to safety 
preserves lives. Yet, injuries are not completely avoidable and will occur on the job. 
Therefore, every organization and workplace should have a safety program to minimize 
the occurrence of injuries.  
Safety is particularly important in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) as it shares 
close links to national security. In this thesis, SAF will refer only to one service—the 
Singapore Army (Land Forces). A small corps of salaried soldiers fills SAF’s rank and 
file, with the vast majority being drafted soldiers. The Singapore Government drafts all 
Singapore male citizens reaching the age of 18 to train and serve in the SAF for a period 
of two years. Thereafter, they transition to the reserve force, where they will return to the 
SAF for refresher training every year. Because of the draft, the safety of soldiers during 
peacetime training and work becomes the vested interest of the entire nation. Families 
sacrifice two years of their sons’ lives for the sake of the nation’s defense and survival. 
This commitment to defense is heavily premised on the faith that in doing so, their son 
would eventually return to them safely. The servicemen and their families must be 
assured that safety is a top priority for the organization, even as the soldiers are put 
through tough and realistic training (CSNS 2014, 69).   
In light of this, the Singapore Army adopted Safety as a core value in the service 
in 2013 (Chow 2013). According to the Singapore Ministry of Defense’s narrative on 
their website section “Safety,” “the Safety core value is hinged upon three key 
principles—(1) each soldier has a crucial part to play, by adopting safety as a core value 
and making it a way of life in his unit; (2) safety is an integral part of training, operations 
and mission success, and (3) safety is an individual, team and command responsibility. 
Being mindful of safety and adhering to safety regulations should be second nature to 
each individual. As members of a team, everyone must always look out for one another 
and take care of each other through the buddy system. Leaders play a pivotal role in 
setting the right safety standards, expectations and culture” (Centre for Leadership 
Development 2015). 
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The principles imply that in order for practices and processes to be safe, everyone 
must play a part in practicing safety, and everyone should know how to do things safely. 
Many of the leadership positions are held by young commissioned officers and non-
commissioned officers who spent the first nine months of their army life training to 
assume leadership positions. The SAF then expects these junior officers immediately to 
transition and lead new draftees for training and work. The problem is that these junior 
officers are also new and need time to become familiar enough with their job to gain 
insights into safety issues. Furthermore, the general background of Singaporean citizens 
does not prepare them well for the job environment within the SAF. Therefore, the 
question at hand is in how best to equip the junior officers with safety knowledge for 
every activity that they undertake within a short amount of time? The creation of an 
exhaustive knowledge base of comprehensive safety analysis for every activity in the 
SAF could help to accelerate the junior officers’ ability to internalize and appreciate these 
activities and their associated safety issues.  
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II. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
A. CURRENT SAFETY PRACTICE IN SAF 
Every organization and workplace should have a comprehensive safety program. 
The safety program should include an analysis of potential injuries and associated risk 
assessments of those injuries.  
The SAF has an instituted safety program. Its safety management is governed by a 
safety management framework. This starts with the conducting officer using a set of 
safety regulations to implement the safety assessments. The Training Safety Regulations 
(TSR) includes activities like route marches, sleep cycles, munitions training, amongst 
many. Each TSR lists a number of regulations regarding the activity.  
Using the TSR, the conducting officer implements the safety risk assessment and 
mitigation for the activity. The conducting officer, usually a drafted junior officer, is 
responsible for planning and executing the activity. In addition to his assessments on 
TSR, he must do another level of assessment that is based on the surrounding context and 
unique to the specific training he is conducting. He has to use his own experience, with 
the advice of more experienced officers, to conduct a safety risk assessment and 
mitigation before commencing use of the system. The end product of the risk assessment 
for the training activity is a Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW), shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  An Approximation of the Typical RAW Worksheet Used in the SAF. 
The RAW documents all activities in the risk assessment outcomes. There are six 
generic steps to conduct the risk assessment for the RAW analysis process as described in 
Figure 2. 
Task: 
Prepared by: Conducting Officer
Overall Risk Level: 











Endorsed by: Supervising Officer
Risk Management Plan (Risk Assessment Worksheet)
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Figure 2.  Steps for RAW Risk Assessment. 
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The conducting officer, typically a commissioned officer who is serving his two-
year drafted term, would use the RAW to perform a preliminary hazard analysis. First, he 
would identify the system (work process) he will be planning and executing. Second, he 
would perform a task decomposition based on the guiding categories of preparation 
phase, execution phase, and recovery phase of the work process. He would list the 
sequence of events for the tasks under the three main categories of Preparation Phase, 
Execution Phase, and Recovery Phase. Hence, for the third step, he would use the 5-M 
factors method (Mission, Man, Machine, Medium, and Management) to identify and 
generate the hazards. The 5-M factors method helps to frame the safety assessment. 
T. P. Wright first developed this method in the late 1940s as a model for examining the 
nature of accidents in the aviation industry and refined the model over the years (Wells 
2001). In every activity, the mission would be the activity to be conducted to achieve the 
intended outcome. Under the “Mission” factor, the analyst considers the complexity 
of the activity and whether the personnel assigned are suited for the activity. The “Man” 
factor refers to the personnel assigned to carry out the activity. Under this factor, the 
analyst considers the associated proficiency, as well as the physiological and 
psychological conditions of the personnel who are carrying out the tasks. The “Machine” 
factor refers to any piece of equipment used for the execution of the activity. The analyst 
considers the serviceability, ergonomics, and appropriateness of the equipment used for 
the activity. The “Management” factor refers to the planning, support, and supervision for 
the activity. “Medium” refers to the environment in which the activity is carried out and 
includes factors like weather and terrain. Using risk assessment matrices, the conducting 
officer would determine the severity, likelihood, and overall level of risk for each hazard. 
These matrices are similar to the ones depicted in United States Navy operation risk 
management OPNAV Instruction 3500.39C (Department of the Navy 2010).  
B. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT PRACTICE 
There are a few shortcomings with this current risk assessment framework, 
namely with steps 2 to 4. Step 2 refers to perform task decomposition; step 3 refers to 
generate hazards; and step 4 refers to assess hazard risk level. In general, the current risk 
assessment method requires the conducting officer to think about the system. Using his 
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own experience or that of the collective knowledge, he must develop a risk assessment 
for the system. Experience comes in the form of other officers on the planning team, 
experience gained by the conducting officer during his participation in previous 
exercises, or knowledge gained from safety incident sharing by other colleagues.  
For step 2 of task decomposition, the current categorization of preparation, 
execution, and recovery phases guide the process. However, those words are too generic 
and vague, and this lack of specific direction can result in varying degrees of detail in the 
task decomposition. More often than not, the task decomposition for the RAW is done at 
a high level instead of being broken down into component tasks for detailed analysis. 
Therefore, the listing of sequence of events and/or breakdown of functions could be very 
detailed for some but scant for others. 
For step 3, the current hazard identification analysis using the preliminary hazard 
listing and 5-M method for framing the risk assessment allows for wide interpretation on 
how thorough the conducting officer must be in populating the hazard list. Therefore, the 
hazard list may not be comprehensive enough for the user fully to appreciate the conduct 
of the activity and the risks associated with each activity. This is especially so for officers 
who may not yet be familiar with the system. 
For step 4, the current risk assessment technique may not provide the sufficient 
directions on how to prioritize one risk over another. According to Vincent Ho, “typical 
risk matrices can correctly and unambiguously compare only a small fraction of 
randomly selected pairs of hazards. They can assign identical ratings to quantitatively 
very different risks” (Ho 2010, 48). As a result, the planner may overlook some 
significant risks.  
Therefore, a comprehensive breakdown of the work process and its corresponding 
risk assessment could identify more hazards and help junior officers quickly become 
familiar with an activity and its safety implications. This is important because despite 
having a safety system, organizations still experience safety lapses; many of them are a 
result of human error. Safety lapses could be due to systemic flaws or human error due to 
negligence and/or lack of enforcement. While unavoidable, these lapses show that there 
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may still be room for improvement in the work process, and this could be one of the ways 
to improve safety. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The foregoing discussion points out the impetus for the current thesis research 
question: can the risk assessment process be strengthened with a structured and 
comprehensive breakdown of the system (e.g., work process, training activity, 
operational task) to subject it to a more thorough risk assessment technique that 
would identify all possible faults, system-wise or human-related? The subsequent 
sections explore the question in depth and propose a feasible solution that could be 





III. OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY 
A. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
This thesis explores alternate methods that SAF could use to evaluate potential 
hazards and conduct a proof-of-concept study to apply a well-practiced systems safety 
method, Process Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (PFMECA) and a well-
known Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) method, Human Error Assessment and 
Reduction Technique (HEART) to identify hazards in SAF work processes. PFMECA is 
a slightly modified version of the Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA).  
Application of alternative, potentially more comprehensive safety analysis 
techniques like PFMECA and HEART could prove more effective at identifying risks. 
This could potentially facilitate front-end risk mitigation measures and/or provide greater 
awareness. Even if the proposed techniques do not identify any new hazards, the exercise 
of deriving the hazard analysis would enhance the junior officers’ understanding of the 
system/process in which they participate and lead to their greater awareness while 
executing the mission. 
Currently, SAF uses FMECA in new acquisition projects to procure technical 
systems that are hardware and software related. SAF conducts FMECA on individual 
hardware and software components, considering their design and interactions from a 
purely mechanical standpoint. However, SAF does not apply FMECA to work processes 
that are typical of SAF training and operational processes. In this thesis, PFMECA is 
adapted to focus primarily on human-centered tasks and applied to work processes that 
utilize these same hardware and software components together with human operators and 
maintainers.  
Furthermore, SAF has not used any HRA techniques, including HEART. This 
thesis aims to study the feasibility of adopting HEART as an alternate hazard assessment 




Figure 3 shows a summary of the overall methodology used in this thesis. This 
thesis selects the work process of replacing one side of an armored fighting vehicle’s 
(AFV) track in the workshop for analysis purposes. First, in conducting his research, the 
author evaluated this process using the standard RAW analysis technique. Second, this 
work process was broken down into its constituent steps via Functional Flow Block 
Diagram (FFBD). Thereafter, the author conducted PFMECA analysis on the work 
process to derive the riskiest tasks. At the same time, the author also conducted a 
literature review to select another suitable risk assessment technique for comparison and 
verification of PFMECA’s results. Eventually, the HEART technique was selected and 
used to evaluate the same AFV work process. Finally, the author compared the results 
from using RAW, PFMECA, and HEART analyses.  
The author of this thesis performed all analyses described in this document in the 




Figure 3.  Methodology for Conducting Thesis Study.    
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IV. SYSTEM DECOMPOSITION  
A. SELECTED SYSTEM (WORK PROCESS) DESCRIPTION 
The selected system is a work process within the maintenance arm of the 
Singapore Army. This work process describes the activity of replacing one side of an 
AFV track in the workshop.  
This work process is generic and largely similar across all AFVs running on 
caterpillar tracks. Because of security restrictions related to the actual operator’s manual 
for the specific AFV used within SAF, this thesis uses a process based upon the 
operator’s manual for the hull section of a M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BAE 1982). 
This vehicle was chosen because it possesses a caterpillar track sub-system design 
representative of the AFV in SAF. In addition, the M3 Bradley AFV’s documented 
tasks for replacing one side of the AFV’s tracks are representative of the tasks for the 
SAF’s AFV.    
The work process for replacing one side of an AFV’s track in the workshop is 
considered an operation. The entire operation comprises setup of the workspace and the 
sequenced operational activities. These operational activities include more than just 
maintenance procedures found in the operator’s manual. For example, the work process 
includes operational activities conducted before and after the maintenance tasks listed in 
the operator’s manual. This allows the creation of an entire chain of operational activities 
involved in work process that exposes the soldiers to hazards. For example, the securing 
of the area of operations before the execution of the maintenance tasks and the disposal 
of the removed tracks after the maintenance tasks are not listed in the operator’s manual, 
but are included as part of the work process. 
B. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY / TASK DECOMPOSITION 
To formulate a logical workflow for the operation, it is important to select and re-
arrange the relevant individual operation and/or maintenance procedure. The work 
process represents a holistic and logical view of the entire operation that an SAF 
maintenance team has to undertake. In this way, the subsequent risk analysis would be 
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able to cover more areas of the operation and potentially identify more problems rather 
than conducting the analysis using the individual maintenance procedures within the 
operator’s manual.  
From the operator’s manual, the author distilled the relevant operational activities 
and merged them into the maintenance work process of replacing one side of an AFV’s 
track in the workshop setting. This was supplemented with the author’s experience to 
develop this work process. The author is a maintenance officer with the SAF with four 
years of experience with maintenance operations, having served the last two years as a 
maintenance depot commander.  
The author created a Functional Flow Block Diagram to clearly depict the 
translation of tasks described in the operator’s manual for the purpose of this analysis. 
Table 1 shows the high level summary of the operational activities and task 
decomposition of the work process sequentially. Level 1 shows the highest level of each 
task within the work process. They are assigned the numbers 1.0 to 13.0 to represent the 
corresponding steps in the operational activity, with number 1.0 representing the first step 
and number 13.0 representing the last step of the activity. Levels 2 and 3 show the sub-
tasks associated with the corresponding higher level tasks. With specific reference to this 
work process, Level 3 corresponds to the lowest level of task decomposition and is 
sufficiently simple for effective hazard analysis using PFMECA and HEART. “Nil” 
entries mean that the associated higher level task has been decomposed to its simplest 
form; there are no further sub-tasks associated with the higher level task. It should be 
noted that this level of task decomposition is not required within the RAW technique.  
These numbers were consistent across the task decomposition table and the 
FFBD. Appendix A shows a detailed breakdown of the operational activities and task 
decomposition. The author generated an FFBD to illustrate the relationships between the 
high level activities and their sub-tasks better. The FFBD decomposed the operational 
activity into three levels. Figure 4 shows the overall FFBD, with the first two levels of the 
decomposition. Figures 5 to 8 show the enlarged views of the FFBD, broken down into 
different phases of the operational activity. Appendix A shows the detailed breakdowns 
to the third level of decomposition. 
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To display the work process in a logical and sequential form, some of the 
operational activities, with their corresponding tasks, may be repeated. Therefore, Table 1 
and Figures 4 to 8 are color coded to display the repeated operational activities. Table 2 
shows a short summary of the repeated tasks. It is likely that there would be slight 
differences in the objectives of each repeated task, and Table 2 shows the detailed 
description as well.  
Table 1.   High-Level Summary of the Operational Activities and 
Tasks for the Selected Work Process 
Level1 ID 
(Match with FFBD) Operational Activities Level2 Operational Tasks 
1.0 Secure Area 
1.1 Identify Area of Operations 
1.2 Cordon off area 
2.0 Position Vehicle 
2.1 Enter Vehicle 
2.2 Start Engine 
2.3 Drive vehicle into position 
2.4 Stop Vehicle 
2.5 Stop Engine 
2.6 Exit Vehicle 
3.0 Break Track 
3.1 Unstow track fixtures and drift pin 
3.2 Loosen track tension 
3.3 Remove track pin (used track shoes) 
4.0 Position Vehicle 
4.1 Enter Vehicle 
4.2 Start Engine 
4.3 Drive vehicle into position 
4.4 Stop Vehicle 
4.5 Stop Engine 
4.6 Exit Vehicle 
5.0 Dispose old track 
5.1 Remove track pin  (from old track shoes) 
5.2 Shift track links 
6.0 Form Track 
6.1 Shift track links 
6.2 Remove track pin (from new track shoes) 
6.3 Join track shoes 
6.4 Torque nut 
7.0 Position Vehicle 
7.1 Enter Vehicle 
7.2 Start Engine 
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Level1 ID 
(Match with FFBD) Operational Activities Level2 Operational Tasks 
7.3 Drive vehicle into position 
7.4 Stop Vehicle 
7.5 Stop Engine 
7.6 Exit Vehicle 
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 
8.1 Check track guide position 
8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 
9.0 Position Vehicle 
9.1 Enter Vehicle 
9.2 Start Engine 
9.3 Drive vehicle into position 
9.4 Stop Vehicle 
9.5 Stop Engine 
9.6 Exit Vehicle 
10.0 Position Track  
10.1 Check track guide position 
10.2 Guide track over Sprocket 
11.0 Join Track  (while on vehicle) 
11.1 Assemble track fixtures 
11.2 Install track fixtures 
11.3 Join track shoes (while on vehicle) 
11.4 Torque nut 
11.5 Remove track fixtures 
12.0 Adjust Track tension 
12.1 Check track tension 
12.2 Tighten track tension 
12.3 Loosen track tension 
13.0 Position Vehicle 
13.1 Enter Vehicle 
13.2 Start Engine 
13.3 Drive vehicle into position 
13.4 Stop Vehicle 
13.5 Stop Engine 
13.6 Exit Vehicle 
 
The same tasks may generate different risks and/or risk levels when performed 
under different contexts. For example, the same task, when performed in the day as 
opposed to at nighttime, could affect the operator’s ability to see, and the disruption of 
the circadian cycles could present additional risks when the task is performed at night. 
However, for the repeated tasks in this activity, the author assessed that these tasks have 
no relevant differences in context that would affect the risk analysis outcomes. The 
 17
author analyzed each repeated task for any differences that could contribute to changes in 
the risk assessment outcomes. The author considered variation in several factors like the 
surrounding environment, the time periods of conducting an activity, and the group of 
personnel conducting the tasks. In addition, he also considered whether there were 
prolonged periods where personnel performed the tasks continuously. 
Changes in the surrounding environment could cause new hazards. For example, 
carrying out the task in the field environment would have additional hazards such as 
uneven ground, higher risk of heat injuries when wearing body armor, and higher risks of 
injuries as a result of range-of-motion limitations caused by cumbersome body armor. In 
this operational activity, the entire operational activity was carried out in the same 
workshop environment. 
Changes in time period of conducting an activity would have an impact on the 
hazards. For example, the act of carrying out a task in the day could be very different 
from carrying out a task at night. It would be riskier to carry out the task at night because 
of low visibility and the disruption of a person’s circadian cycle leading to lack of sleep, 
which would increase probability of error. The operational activity analyzed in this thesis 
was slated to take place during business hours, under daylight conditions.  
Changes in the weather could cause risk assessment outcomes to be different. 
However, it would be hard to predict which task would be subject to inclement weather. 
Furthermore, during inclement weather, work activities would be temporarily stopped. 
Hence, the operational activity was assumed to be carried out under the same weather 
conditions, and thus this factor was not considered to have any impact on the risk 
assessment outcome of the operational activity. 
Changes in personnel carrying out the task could impact the risk assessment 
outcomes. This largely refers to the skill of these personnel. Personnel with fewer, or 
irrelevant skills, would be at higher risk of sustaining injury. In this operational activity, 
the same set of personnel executed the tasks throughout. Typically the set of personnel 
would come from the same group of draftees, have the same demographic characteristics, 
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and have undergone the same training phases before being assigned to units. Therefore, 
the risk levels specific to their skills remain the same. 
Prolonged periods of performing tasks could impact the risk assessment outcome. 
However, personnel with the same relevant skills would be assigned to the operational 
activity and would take turns carrying out the task. Therefore, risks associated with 
prolonged or repeated task execution, such as dulling of senses and fatigue, would have 
minimal impact on an operational activity. For example, in the repeated task of 
positioning the vehicle, the driver and ground guides would have sufficient rest in 
between tasks, the area of operations for executing the operational activity would be the 
same, and the mechanical actions would be exactly the same. Therefore, subsequent 





























Figure 6.  An Enlarged View of the Work Process FFBD (Phase 2). 
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Figure 7.  An Enlarged View of the Work Process FFBD (Phase 3). 
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Figure 8.  An Enlarged View of the Work Process FFBD (Phases 4 and 5). 
 24
Table 2.   A Brief Summary of the Color Coded Operational Activities and/or Tasks.  
Color Code Operational Activity Level Description 
  Position Vehicle 
2.0 To drive the vehicle from parking lot into area of operations. 
4.0 To move the vehicle backwards, so that the old track will fall out and end up in front of the vehicle. 
7.0 
To move the vehicle forward, so that the vehicle can mount onto the NEW track links, and 
move along the track until the first road wheel reaches the 9th track shoe (counting from the 
first track shoe that was initially furthest away from vehicle). 
9.0 To move the vehicle backward, so that the backward rotation of the sprocket will force the track to move up and back over the top of the sprocket and along the top of the road wheels. 
13.0 To drive the vehicle back to the parking lot. 
  Loosen Track Tension 
3.2 To loosen track tension, to facilitate the breaking of OLD tracks. 
12.3 To loosen track tension if the track is found to be too tight after joining the NEW tracks. 
  Remove Track Pins 
3.3 To remove Track Pins from NEW track shoes, to link the two separate pieces of Track Links together. 
5.1 To remove Track Pins from OLD track shoes, to break apart the OLD Track into separate Track Links. 
  Shift Track Links 
5.2 To move the OLD Track Links to disposal cage for disposal. 
6.1 To move the NEW Track Links to Area of Operations. 
  Torque Nut 
6.4 To torque the Track Pin nuts after joining the track shoes together, to prevent the nuts from loosening during operations. 
11.4 The purpose is exactly the same as 6.4. 
  Position Track 
8.0 To lift the first 9 track shoes and guide them over the sprocket wheel. The track shoe has to be fitted onto the teeth of the sprocket wheel. 
10.0 
To maintain the position of the first 9 track shoes and ensure that the track shoes are still fitted 
onto the teeth of the sprocket wheels. This is a concurrent activity, as the vehicle is moving 
backward. 
 25
C. EXAMPLE RAW  
For meaningful comparisons to be made, an example RAW was done, and Table 
6 shows the analysis results. The example RAW would be the basis of comparison with 
the FMECA and HEART processes. 
It is important to note that RAW does not require an FFBD. Instead, with RAW, 
one only needs to divide the operational steps of replacing one side of an AFV’s track 
into only three possible categories: Preparation, Execution, and Recovery. 
For each hazard, the severity, probability, and corresponding risk levels were 
determined. Severity was determined by the potential consequence that would have 
occurred as a result of the hazard. It was determined by assessing the injury severity, loss 
of time, money, personnel and/or ability to achieve the mission. For probability, this was 
to determine the likelihood that a potential consequence may happen due to the hazard. 
Finally, the corresponding risk levels were determined by matching them to the risk 
assessment matrix. Tables 3 to 5 show an example of the severity table, probability table, 
and risk assessment table, respectively.   
Table 3.   Severity Table 
Severity Description 
Catastrophic Resulting in complete mission failure Resulting in death or is life threatening 
Critical Resulting in significantly degraded mission capability Resulting in major injury to personnel 
Marginal Resulting in degraded mission capability Resulting in minor injury to personnel 







Table 4.   Probability Table 
Probability Description 
Frequent Always occurs or happens most of the time 
Likely Happens often 
Occasional Occurs sometimes or irregularly 
Seldom Remotely possible 
Unlikely Not likely to happen but not impossible 
 
Table 5.   Risk Assessment Matrix 
Severity Probability 






High High High Medium 
Critical Extremely High High High Medium Low 
Marginal High Medium Medium Low Low 
Negligible Medium Low Low Low Low 












      
     
Securing 
the Area RAW.1 
Management. 
Insufficient space may 
be catered Negligible Occasional Low 
  RAW.2 Man. Inadequate rest the night prior Critical Occasional High 
  RAW.3 
Man. Inadequate 
hydration prior to 
activity Critical Occasional High 
  RAW.4 Man. Inadequate skillset for the task Critical Occasional High 









Severity Probability Risk Level 
Position 
Vehicle RAW.6 
Machine. Vehicle may 
malfunction Critical Seldom 
Medi
um 
  RAW.7 Man. Inadequate rest the night prior. Critical Occasional High 
  RAW.8 
Man. Poor 
communication 














working together. Critical Likely High 
  RAW.10 Man. Inadequate skillset for the task Critical Occasional High 
  RAW.11 
Man. Under stress to 
complete the task 
quickly. Critical Occasional High 
  RAW.12 Man. Reckless attitude  Critical Occasional High 
  RAW.13 
Management. 
Insufficient rest time 
between activities Critical Occasional High 
  RAW.14 Machine. Vehicle may malfunction Critical Seldom 
Medi
um 




working together Critical Likely High 
  RAW.16 Man. Inadequate skillset for the task Critical Occasional High 
  RAW.17 
Man. Under stress to 
complete the task 
quickly Critical Occasional High 
  RAW.18 Man. Reckless attitude Critical Occasional High 
  RAW.19 Man. Improper lifting technique Critical Occasional High 









Severity Probability Risk Level 
  RAW.21 
Management. 
Insufficient rest time in 
between activities 








Man. Improper lifting 
technique Critical Occasional High 
  RAW.23 Man. Inadequate strength Critical Occasional High 




working together. Critical Likely High 
  RAW.25 
Medium. Slippery 
floors may cause slip 






V. CHOOSING ALTERNATE RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD 
A. FAILURE MODES, EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS (FMECA) 
There are many risk assessment techniques available, each suited for different 
purposes and covering different levels of detail. For this thesis, the PFMECA technique is 
selected.  
In its original form, the Failure Modes, Effects Analysis (FMEA) technique is a 
bottom-up, step-by-step approach for identifying all possible failures in a system. Both 
the FMECA and PFMECA techniques are variants of the FMEA technique. The FMECA 
technique, which SAF currently uses, is basically the same as the FMEA technique, 
except that it adds criticality analysis to the failure modes and also includes the analysis 
of possible failure mode detection methods (Ericson 2005). The FMECA technique adds 
value to the FMEA process by evaluating the criticality of the failure modes. 
Even within the FMECA technique, there are different approaches and variations. 
The manufacturing industry developed the PFMECA specifically for work processes 
(Raheja and Gullo 2012). PFMECA differs only slightly from FMECA in that it includes 
two additional columns to aid in the analysis process. They are “Process Name and 
Description” and “Process Step,” for easier implementation when assessing work 
processes. Table 7 shows a brief summary of the techniques described previously. 
Table 7.   Brief Overview of FMEA and the Variants Described in this Thesis. 
Technique Name Description 
FMEA A bottom-up, step-by-step approach for identifying all possible 
failures in a system 
FMECA FMEA with added criticality analysis  
PFMECA FMECA with added columns, “Process Name and Description” and 
“Process Step” for easier implementation when assessing work 
processes 
 
The PFMECA technique is a procedure-based qualitative risk assessment 
technique that the practitioner can use to identify a system (product or process) weakness 
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(Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011, 385). According to Blanchard and Fabrycky, it includes 
the required step-by-step procedure that allows the practitioner to scrutinize and evaluate 
all possible pathways in which a system can fail, the potential failure effects, and the 
consequences of these effects. In addition, they also mentioned that although it is best to 
use PFMECA to impact design upfront in the system life cycle, PFMECA also can 
evaluate and improve existing systems on a continuing basis. The PFMECA technique is 
a disciplined bottom-up evaluation risk assessment technique. It can evaluate potential 
failure modes of the subsystems, assemblies, components or functions. This ties in well 
with the FFBD breakdown of the system (Ericson 2005). As such, using the PFMECA 
will help improve task decomposition process due to the need to analyze the work 
process from the bottom up. Furthermore, since the PFMECA analysis approach 
facilitates the thorough generation and identification of possible hazards, this could 
potentially address one of RAW’s shortcomings. 
For this thesis, the author selected the PFMECA technique as an alternate risk 
assessment method because its close variant, the FMECA, was already in use in SAF. In 
systems development and acquisition processes, SAF practitioners have been using the 
FMECA technique regularly to improve system reliability in technical systems and 
systems acquisition. If the PFMECA technique proved suitable for operational work 
processes to improve safety in the SAF, there would be a common framework in the SAF 
and, therefore, make its adoption easier. Furthermore, FMECA is probably the most 
widely applied risk assessment technique in industry (Moradi 2010). Using a tried and 
tested technique will make it easier to adopt and accept the technique for use in SAF.  
As PFMECA is a qualitative or semi-quantitative process, it is uncomplicated and 
can be easily learned and understood. This makes it ideal for SAF, most of whose officers 
have only about one year of service in their active units after graduating from their 
vocational training schools. In addition, PFMECA has been widely used in many 
industries. The PFMECA technique also has been applied to maintenance processes in 
the military context (Yanliang et al. 2011). 
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B. PROCESS-FMECA (PFMECA)  
There is a nine-step procedure for conducting PFMECA. The procedure for 
conducting PFMECA in this thesis refers to Clifton A. Ericson II’s Hazard Analysis 
Techniques for System Safety (Ericson 2005), and was modified for this analysis to focus 
on human-centered tasks. This assumes that the technical assessment of the system’s 
hardware and software subsystems and components has been done during the system 
acquisition phase; and, the design of the system has been refined to remove failures due 
to component failures. This keeps the PFMECA process manageable for this thesis. Table 
8 lists the steps for PFMECA. For the purpose of this thesis, steps 3, 7, 8, and 9 from 
Table 8 were omitted. This was because the author developed the PFMECA for a team, 
and since there was no actual execution of the operational activities, there would be no 
requirement to monitor, track, and document the PFMECA. The Risk Priority Number 
(RPN) was calculated as the product of the Severity, Occurrence, and Detectability 
values. There were no definitive RPN threshold values to decide the cut-off values, as 
this depends on many factors, including organization risk appetites, legal or safety 
requirements, and quality control. The author performed a descriptive statistical analysis 
on the 200 PFMECA RPN values, created a cumulative frequency curve, and selected the 
top five percent of the values to be analyzed. As such, the cut-off RPN was 400. 
Therefore, for the thesis analysis, the threshold values for PFMECA RPN were set at 400. 
Therefore, failures with RPN greater than 400 would be considered unacceptable, and 
recommended corrective actions would be prescribed. Table 9 shows the format for 
FMECA template to be used while Tables 10 to 12 show the severity scale, occurrence 
scale, and detection scale that were used, respectively. 
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Table 8.   Steps for Conducting PFMECA. Adapted from Ericsson (2005).
Step Task Description 
1 Define System 
Define, scope, and bound the system. Define the mission, mission 
phases, and mission environments. Understand the system design and 
operation  
2 Plan PFMECA 
Establish PFMECA goals, definitions, worksheets, schedule, and 
process. Start with functional PFMECA then move to PFMECA of 
hardware that is safety critical (identified from functional PFMECA). 
Divide the system under analysis into the smallest segments desired for 
the analysis. Identify items to be analyzed and establish indenture levels 
for items / functions to be analyzed 
3 Select Team 
Select all team members to participate in PFMECA and establish 
responsibilities. Utilize team member expertise from several different 
disciplines (e.g., design, test, manufacturing) 
4 Acquire Data 
Acquire all of the necessary design and process data needed (e.g., 
functional diagrams, schematics, and drawings) for the system, 
subsystems and functions for FMECA. Refine the item indenture levels 
for analysis. Identify realistic failure modes of interest for the analysis. 
Identify realistic failure modes of interest for the analysis and obtain 
component failure rates 
5 Conduct PFMECA 
1. Identify and list the items to be evaluated
2. Obtain concurrence on the list and level of detail
3. Transfer the list to the PFMECA worksheet
4. Analyze each item on the list by completing the PFMECA worksheet
questions 
5. Have the PFMECA worksheets validated by a system designer for
correctness 
6 Recommend Corrective Action 
Recommend corrective action for failure modes with unacceptable risk 
Assign responsibility and schedule for implementing corrective action 
7 Monitor corrective action 
Review test results to ensure that safety recommendations and system 
safety requirements are effective in mitigating hazards as anticipated 
8 Track hazards Transfer identified hazards into the hazard tracking system 
9 Document PFMECA Document the entire PFMECA process on the worksheets. Update for new information and closure of assigned corrective actions 
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Table 9.   FMECA Template 
PFMECA 




















































Table 10.   Severity Scale for PFMECA. Adapted from Reichert (2004). 
Severity Scale 
Scale Description Definition 
1 No danger Failure causes no injury and has no impact on the system 
2 Slight danger Failure causes no injury. However, the potential for minor 
injury exists. There is little or no effect on the system  
3 - 4 Low to Moderate danger Failure causes very minor or no injury, and/or results in minor 
system problems that can be overcome with minor 
modifications to system 
5 - 6 Moderate danger Failure causes minor injury with some personnel 
dissatisfaction, and/or major system problems 
7 Dangerous Failure causes minor to moderate injury, and/or major system 
problems requiring major repairs or significant rework 
8 - 9 Very dangerous Failure could cause major or permanent injury to personnel 
(work crew or external personnel), and/or could cause serious 
system disruption with interruption in service, with prior 
warning 
10 Extremely dangerous Failure could cause death of a personnel (work crew or 
external personnel), and/or could cause total system 
breakdown without any prior warning 
Table 11.   Occurrence Scale for PFMECA. Adapted from Reichert (2004). 
Occurrence Scale 
Scale Description Definition 
1 Remote probability of 
occurrence 
Failure almost never occurs; and, no one remembers the last 
failure 
2 Low probability of 
occurrence 
Failure occurs rarely; or, failure occurs once per year 
3 - 4 Moderate probability of 
occurrence 
Failure occurs occasionally; or, failure once every three months 
5 - 6 Moderately high 
probability of occurrence 
Failure occurs about once a month 
7 - 8 Very high probability of 
occurrence 
Failure occurs frequently; or, failure occurs about once a week 
9 Failure is almost inevitable Failure occurs predictability; or, failure occurs every 3 or 4 days 
10 Certain probability of 
occurrence 
Failure occurs at least once a day; or, failure occurs almost every 
time 
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Table 12.   Detection Scale for PFMECA. Adapted from Reichert (2004). 
Detection Scale  
Scale Description Definition 
1 Almost certain There are automatic “shut-offs” or constraints that prevent 
failure. 
2 Very high There is 100% inspection of the process and it is automated. 
3 - 4 High There is 100% inspection or review of the process but it is not 
automated. 
5 Moderate chance of detection There is process for double-checks or inspection but it is not 
automated and/or is applied only to a sample and/or relies on 
vigilance. 
6 - 7 Remote The error can be detected with manual inspection but no 
process is in place so that detection is left to chance. 
8 - 9 Very remote/unreliable The failure can be detected only with thorough inspection and 
this is not feasible or cannot be readily done. 
10 No chance of detection There is no known mechanism for detecting the failure. 
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C. PERFORMING PFMECA ON SELECTED SYSTEM 
The author performed the PFMECA analysis on the work process of replacing one 
side of an AFV in the workshop environment. To keep the PFMECA manageable for the 
purpose of this thesis, the hardware and component level failures were ignored except for 
the most critical ones that directly interface with human actions. Table 13 shows an 
example from the completed analysis. Appendix B shows the detailed analysis, including 
the fully worked PFMECA table. 
For each lowest level task, in this case 2.1.1—climb onto top of vehicle, the 
expert team would brainstorm on the potential failure modes. In the thesis, the author 
served as a representative user for this analysis, as well as a subject matter expert on the 
AFV repair activity. For each of the failure modes, the failure effects were described. The 
severity of each failure effect was assigned a number from the Severity Scale in Table 10. 
Thereafter for each failure mode, all possible potential causes of the particular failure 
mode would be noted and assigned a probability of occurrence. Since these failure modes 
were related to human actions and errors, the failure modes were referenced from the 
Handbook of Human Factors and Ergonomics (Sharit 2012). The error modes selected 
were timing, force, distance and/or magnitude, speed, and direction. Timing determines 
when actions are performed too early or too late, or omitted. Most of the actions involved 
coordination and timing that could affect the safety outcomes. Force refers to actions 
performed with insufficient or too much force. This is applicable because of the 
mechanical nature of the tasks involved. The mechanical actions involving generating 
movements and arm swings make distance and/or magnitude and direction applicable. 
For the completed example in Table 13, work environment and/or work schedule 
was one of the contextual factors that could influence human performance. Factors such 
as time constraints would have a negative impact on human performance and might lead 
to human error. For each of these failure causes, the author determined and assigned a 
value. If there were control measures to enhance detectability, the detectability would 
generally be higher and, hence, assigned a lower number.  
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The author ranked these resulting failure causes and associated tasks according to 
the RPN values, from the highest to the lowest. Table 14 shows the rank of failure causes 
and associated tasks that had RPN values above 400. In this aspect, the risk associated 
with each task took on the RPN value of the failure cause that generated the highest RPN.  
For all tasks, the people at risk of committing the mistakes and/or sustaining 
injuries were the technicians who carried out those tasks. However, in the task of 
positioning the vehicle, the driver and ground guides were at risk of committing the 
mistakes while the technicians were at risk of sustaining injuries. 
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2.1 Enter Vehicle 2.1.1 Climb onto 
top of 
vehicle
PFMECA.16 Failure to gain proper 
footing on latches
Fall from height (up to 2 
meters), leading to fall injuries
9 Slippery Footholds due to presence 
of water, oil and/or grease
2 Manual Inspection 





2.1 Enter Vehicle 2.1.1 Climb onto 
top of 
vehicle
PFMECA.17 Failure to gain proper 
footing on latches
Fall from height (up to 2 
meters), leading to fall injuries
9 Time constraints leading to rushing 
of actions







2.1 Enter Vehicle 2.1.1 Climb onto 
top of 
vehicle
PFMECA.18 Failure to maintain 
balance on top of the 
vehicle 
Fall from height (up to 
2.6meters), leading to fall 
injuries
9 Slippery surfaces due to presence 
of water, oil and/or grease
2 Nil 6 108
2.0 Position 
Vehicle
2.1 Enter Vehicle 2.1.1 Climb onto 
top of 
vehicle
PFMECA.19 Entanglement of 
wearables (i.e. 
necklace, ring, loose 
clothing, bootlaces)
Impeded movement may 
cause loss of balance
8 Loose apparel 2 Nil 6 96
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6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut PFMECA.168 480 





3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free PFMECA.99 441 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 
Drive vehicle 
into position 2.3.5 
Manipulate 
steering yokes PFMECA.64 432 





3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free PFMECA.102 432 





3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free PFMECA.105 432 





3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free PFMECA.106 432 





3.3.8 Hit Shoe PFMECA.113 432 





3.3.8 Hit Shoe PFMECA.117 432 





3.3.8 Hit Shoe PFMECA.120 432 










8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 8.2.2 
Place track on 
sprocket PFMECA.179 432 
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut PFMECA.167 400 
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D. RESULTS 
Key results of the PFMECA analysis show that the most critical failure modes 
arose from the operational activities of breaking track, forming track, positioning track, 
and positioning vehicle, as shown in Table 14. Aside from the operational activity of 
positioning the vehicle, all other operational activities involved manual labor and the use 
of associated labor tools like crowbars, sledgehammers, and wrenches. These activities 
were associated with high severity if failure happens. When too much force is used, the 
blunt force trauma to human bodies with uncontrolled force and heavy objects could 
result in severe injuries.  
The occurrence of failures associated with these activities was also high. This is 
normal because the soldiers generally have not been exposed to heavy and manual labor 
prior to being drafted. Furthermore, training and practice during training schools is 
limited because of the trainees-to-equipment ratio. Therefore, it would be difficult to 
familiarize the soldiers with handling these tools and their use.  
Using the PFMECA technique, the author generated a sizeable number of faults, 
200 failure causes as opposed to the 25 generated by RAW. Compared to the RAW, the 
PFMECA was better than the RAW in steps 2 to 4 of the risk assessment process. For 
step 2, task decomposition, the PFMECA technique necessitated a thorough breakdown 
of the activity into the component tasks, while RAW did not, and only specified three 
broad areas to be analyzed: preparation, execution, and recovery phases. The RAW 
produced only five broad operational activities. The vague guidelines on the 
categorization for task decomposition did not prompt a rigorous thought process for 
breaking down the operational activity into simple tasks. Furthermore, the subsequent 5-
M factor method did not necessitate a detailed breakdown of tasks in order for hazard 
identification to take place. As such, the RAW technique produced fewer operational 
activities in this case. On the other hand, PFMECA, through the necessary use of FFBD 
task decomposition, forced the author to generate 13 operational activities, 53 Level 2 
tasks and 175 Level 3 tasks. 
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With its thorough task decomposition, the PFMECA analysis produced many 
more failure modes and effects than RAW did for step 3. The PFMECA technique 
requires a review of every step of the operational activity for potential failure modes and 
effects. For example, RAW analysis produced only three identifiable hazards for the 
operational activity of positioning the vehicle. As the operational activities were not 
further broken down into simpler tasks, the author was forced to think of the hazard 
possibilities at a very high level. This prevented visualization of the activity and/or task, 
resulting in only three hazards. This problem was further compounded when there were 
no explicit guidelines on how to assess the hazards for each task using the 5-M factor 
method. On the other hand, the author was able to generate 67 different failure causes for 
the same operational activity, using PFMECA. The detailed task decomposition, 
combined with the logical hazard analysis flow, allowed the author to identify hazards 
more effectively. Therefore, for step 3, generating hazards, the PFMECA technique was 
more thorough. 
The structure of the PFMECA analysis process allowed for a more comprehensive 
analysis of each hazard, otherwise known as failure mode in PFMECA. Furthermore, the 
PFMECA worksheet states the thought process to be used for deriving the risk levels. For 
example, the author analyzed the failure to secure sufficient area for the operational 
activity for both RAW and PFMECA techniques. This generated risks RAW.1 for RAW 
analysis, and PFMECA.1 and PFMECA.2 for the PFMECA analysis. RAW.1 was brief 
and unclear. It stated the hazard as insufficient space cordoned off to carry out the work 
process. However, it did not explain the thought process that should be used to derive the 
hazard. It did not show what would have caused the hazard, nor did it show the 
consequences. Where RAW.1 was brief and unclear, the author was able to generate two 
risks through PFMECA, namely PFMECA.1 and PFMECA.2. In each of the PFMECA 
risks, the cause of risk, the effects of risk, and the current control measures were clearly 
stated next to the identified risk. Since every failure could be easily traced back to the 
specific failure mode and cause, it made administering remedial actions and monitoring 
efforts easier and more direct. Furthermore, the detailed analysis report provides a helpful 
reference and educational tool about the activity that junior officers would be leading.  
 42
For step 4, access hazard risk levels, the author was better able to differentiate and 
prioritize the risks with PFMECA as it utilizes RPN instead of generic risk matrices. The 
example RAW classified most of the risks as high. In fact, 21 out of 25 hazards were 
HIGH risks. On the other hand, the PFMECA failure causes had RPNs that were spread 
out across the range of 9 to 480. The analyst would have an easier time prioritizing these 
risks. 
E. SUGGESTED REMEDIAL ACTIONS 
Of the 12 failure causes that had an RPN of greater than 400, time constraints 
imposed on the task had the highest contribution to the top failure causes, followed by 
insufficient training and/or exposure (see Table 15). This is logical because the work 
tempo within the logistics bases, especially the armored fighting vehicle maintenance 
bases, is normally high. This is generally due to staffing issues, relatively high 
breakdown rates, and tedious maintenance tasks. Therefore, time to turnaround vehicles 
quickly enough to meet operational and training needs constrains the maintenance crew.  
Table 15.   Breakdown of the Failure Causes with an RPN above 400. 
Failure causes Quantity 
Time constraints, leading to rushing or skipping steps 5 
Insufficient training and/or exposure, leading to judgment errors 
or forgetting steps 
5 
Wrong interpretation and execution as a result of confusion during 




Table 16 shows some preliminary remedial actions to mitigate the identified risks 
based on the safety manuals, training safety regulations, and the past lessons learnt 
archives available in the SAF. In general, there is a compelling need to provide additional 
time for any maintenance activity, the need to conduct just-in-time refresher training 
demonstrations and briefings emphasizing the need to be careful and deliberate, and to 
enforce supervision of all the critical operational activities.  
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More research into human reliability analysis and systems safety needs to be done 
to develop a research-backed remedial action plan for the risks identified. This is not 
within the scope of this thesis. 
Table 16.   Recommended Remedial Actions 
Failure causes Remedial Action 
Time constraints, leading to 
rushing or skipping steps 
1. Plan for sufficient time for activity 
2. Emphasize the danger of rushing through 
3. Emphasize on the importance of proper 
technique 
4. Enforce supervision by squad leader 
 
Insufficient training and/or 
exposure, leading to judgment 
errors or forgetting steps 
1. Pre-activity brief and demonstration 
2. More training to be conducted 
3. Enforce supervision by squad leader 
 
Wrong interpretation and 
execution as a result of confusion 
during coordination from 
miscommunication 
1. Ensure proper training 
2. Enforce supervision by squad leader 
Distractions 
(leading to skipping of steps) 
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VI. CHOOSING SECONDARY RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD
One of the objectives of this thesis is to study the feasibility of adopting alternate 
methods to identify the potential for human error. In addition to employing a method 
familiar to the SAF, the author applied a Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) method to 
examine whether it is better than the RAW and/or the PFMECA analysis. Therefore, this 
section reviews a Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) method. 
A. COMPARISON OF HRA TECHNIQUES 
Human reliability analysis is closely linked to reliability engineering and has 
become seamlessly integrated into the safety engineering domain it supports (Boring 
2012). Like risk assessment techniques, there are an abundance of techniques available. 
In fact, there are as many as 72 potential HRA methods and tools available (Bell and 
Holroyd 2009). However, Bell and Holroyd’s study pointed out that very few methods 
are fully developed, in widespread use, suitable for generic use, and validated by research 
studies.  
There is no known HRA method currently utilized in the SAF to guide this author 
to a method for examination in this thesis. Therefore, the author developed a set of 
criteria to scope the selection of a suitable HRA method. This set included the following: 
 fully developed and under widespread use across multiple industries
 open access to assessment method
 generic (non-nuclear industry specific)
 preferably validated and proven by research studies
 simple and easy to learn and execute
First generation methods were considered fully developed. Although second 
generation methods attempt to improve upon first generation methods by incorporating 
contextual effects to capture the complexities surrounding human failures (French et al. 
2011, 753), they are still considered as under development (Bell and Holroyd 2009). 
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In the same study by Bell and Holroyd, it was determined that there are four key 
first-generation HRA methods openly available for public use, as shown in Table 17. 
They are the Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP), the Accident 
Sequence Evaluation Program (ASEP), the Human Error Assessment and Reduction 
Technique (HEART), and the Simplified Plant Analysis Risk Human Reliability 
Assessment (SPAR-H).  
Table 17.   Key First Generation HRA Methods with Open Access 
HRA Method Applicable Domain 
THERP Nuclear with wider applications 
ASEP Nuclear
HEART Generic
SPAR-H Nuclear with wider applications 
ASEP was determined to be a nuclear-specific tool and was not suitable for this 
work process. Table 18 shows a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages for the 
remaining HRA methods. 
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Table 18.   Comparison of THERP, HEART, and SPAR-H. 
Adapted from Bell and Holroyd (2009). 
Advantages Disadvantages 
THERP - THERP is well used in 
practice 
- It has a powerful 
methodology that can be 
audited 
- It is founded on a database 
of information that is 
included in the THERP 
handbook 
- THERP can be resource intensive and time consuming 
- It does not offer enough guidance on modeling 
scenarios and the impact of Error Producing Conditions 
(EPC) on task performance and Human Error 
Probabilities (HEP). HEP is defined as the probability of 
a human committing an error while performing a task. 
EPC are factors that could increase the probability of 
human errors. Some examples are unfamiliarity with 
task, time shortages to execute task, and poor feedback 
on performed task 
- The level of detail that is included in THERP may be 
excessive for many assessments 
HEART - A versatile, quick and 
simple human-reliability-
calculation method, which 
also gives the user 
(whether engineer or 
ergonomist) suggestions 
on error reduction 
- Requires relatively limited 
resources to complete an 
assessment 
- Error dependency modeling is not included 
- Requires greater clarity of description to assist users 
when discriminating between generic tasks and their 
associated EPCs; there is potential for two assessors to 
calculate very different HEPs for the same task 
- Lack of information about the extent to which tasks 
should be decomposed for analysis 
- Potential for double counting (some elements of EPCs 
are implicit in the task description) 
- Subjective nature of determining the assessed proportion 
of affect 
SPAR-H - A simple underlying 
model makes SPAR-H 
relatively easy to use and 
results are traceable 
- The EPCs included cover 
many situations where 
more detailed analysis is 
not required 
- The THERP-like 
dependence model can be 
used to address both 
subtask and event 
sequence dependence 
- The degree of resolution of the EPCs may be inadequate 
for detailed analysis 
- No explicit guidance is provided for addressing a wider 
range of PSFs when needed, but analysts are encouraged 
to use more recent context developing methods if more 
detail is needed for their application, particularly as 
related to diagnosis errors 
- Although the authors checked the SPAH-H underlying 
data for consistency with other methods, the basis for 
selection of final values was not always clear 
- The method may not be appropriate where more realistic, 
detailed analysis of diagnosis errors is needed 
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Due to the need for a relatively resource-light and easy-to-use technique, the 
author dropped the THERP technique. HEART was a very quick and straightforward 
analysis technique. This technique helps the practitioner to receive suggestions that can 
possibly reduce the error occurrence; and it is highly flexible in applicability across 
domains and industries (Adhikari et al. 2009). In addition, the HEART technique could 
be incorporated easily into the entire risk analysis method. The HEART technique would 
be compatible with the work done by FFBD and FMECA for task decomposition. 
Moreover, Kirwan independently validated the HEART technique. It is one of the few 
techniques that has been independently validated (Kirwan et al. 1997, 17). Therefore, 
HEART was the appropriate selection for this thesis.  
B. PERFORMING HEART TECHNIQUE ON IDENTIFIED WORK TASKS 
To analyze the tasks, the HEART analysis technique involves identifying the most 
appropriate task description based on the reference list of generic tasks and the associated 
basic HEP. The HEART technique utilized the FFBD process. For each task, one must 
identify all applicable error producing conditions from the reference list and assign the 
associated multipliers to the HEP. One assigns each EPC a proportion of effect and 
calculates the corresponding assessed effect. The final HEP is calculated based on the 
product of the basic HEP and the sum-product of the assessed effects. Appendix C lists 
the detailed steps and reference lists. 
Research for this thesis applied the HEART analysis technique to the replacement 
of one side of the tracks of an AFV in the workshop environment. As in the PFMECA 
analysis, the thesis author was the representative user performing the HEART analysis. 
Table 19 shows a worked example, with reference to task 3.3.2, drive track pin partly 
free. From the Generic Task table, the task for driving the track pin partly free is a fairly 
simple task that could be performed rather rapidly by a well-trained operator. Thus, an 
unreliability value of 0.12 was assigned. For the rest of the tasks, the author assessed 
level of complexity and assigned higher HEP values to tasks that require higher levels of 
comprehension and/or skill, such as driving the AFV and/or guiding the AFV. Next, the 
author selected all possible EPCs from the reference list of EPCs provided. The author 
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also considered any EPC that he deemed to affect the human operator, considered the 
proportion of effect for each EPC based on the specific context of the task, and gave a 
value based on expert judgment. For example, he assigned the highest assessed 
proportion of effect to the EPC of time shortage. The values range from zero to one. This 
is because time limitation would be more likely to force the soldier to rush through his 
actions, and this is deemed to cause errors with serious consequences. Thereafter, the 
assessed effect was calculated according to the following formula (Chandler et al. 2006).  
ܣݏݏ݁ݏݏ݁݀	ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ ൌ ሼሺܧܲܥ	ܯݑ݈݅ݐ݌݈݅݁ݎ െ 1ሻ	ሺܣݏݏ݁ݏݏ݁݀	ܲݎ݋݌݋ݎݐ݅݋݊	݋݂	ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐሻሽ ൅ 1   
The final HEP value for the specific task is the product of the generic task 
unreliability and the assessed effects of every EPC. 
Table 19.   Worked Example for HEART Analysis 
Appendix C shows the fully worked HEART table. Again, there is no specific 
threshold value to decide where to place the most emphasis and focus. This depends on a 
multitude of factors, including an organization’s risk appetite, any industry standards, 
safety or even legal requirements, and any other factors like imposed quality control 
(Forrest 2016). Similarly, the author conducted a descriptive statistical analysis on the 47 
HEART HEP values, created a cumulative frequency curve, and selected the top 25 










Unfamiliarity 17 0.01 1.16
Time shortage 11 0.3 4
Misperception of risks 4 0.05 1.15
Inexperienced Personnel 3 0.1 1.2
Inadequate checking 3 0.05 1.1
Unreliable instruments 1.5 0.01 1.005
Physcial capabilities 1.4 0.2 1.08
Low loading 1.1 0.05 1.005




was much lower than the PFMECA RPN outcomes, a larger percentage was chosen to 
generate a sufficiently sized dataset for discussion in this thesis. Selecting a larger 
percentage would lead to a more meaningful comparison and discussion of the riskiest 
hazards identified by both PFMECA and HEART techniques.  
Therefore, the top 10 riskiest tasks were selected for the purpose of this 
discussion. However, as two of the tasks had the same HEART HEP value of 0.8876, 
namely HEART.36 and HEART.37, they were counted as one in the selection. Therefore, 
effectively 11 tasks were selected. 
Table 20 shows the top 11 riskiest tasks that were identified through the HEART 
analysis. 
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Table 20.   Top 10 Human Errors Identified by HEART Technique 
Human Error Probability
(Nominal Unreliability 
Probability x Assessed Effect1 
x Assessed Effect 2 …)
HEART ID Rank
Level1 Operational Activities Level2 Operational Tasks Level3 Sub-tasks
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin(USED track shoes) 3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free 0.921991415 HEART.23 1
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.4 Manipulate brake and accelerator pedals 0.912083328 HEART.11 2
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.5 Manipulate steering yokes 0.9030528 HEART.12 3
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.1 Join two track links 0.892710397 HEART.29 4
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.1 Lift track links 0.888269052 HEART.27 5
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 8.2.2 Place track on sprocket 0.887639412 HEART.36 6
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 8.2.3 Maintain track propped position 0.887639412 HEART.37 6
11.0 Join Track (while on vehicle) 11.2 Install track fixtures 11.2.1 Move ends of track together 0.81563001 HEART.39 8
1.0 Secure Area 1.1 Identify Area of Operations (AO) Nil Nil 0.684288 HEART.1 9
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.3 Push trolley to work area 0.669532798 HEART.28 10
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut 0.66561264 HEART.33 11
Process Steps, Names and Description
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C. DISCUSSION—HEART VS. RAW RESULTS 
Key results of the HEART analysis show that the operational activities with the 
highest probability of failure are derived from the operational activities of breaking track, 
forming track, positioning track, positioning vehicle, joining track, disposing track, and 
securing area, as shown in Table 20.  
For step 2 of the risk analysis process, task decomposition, HEART is more 
comprehensive than RAW because of the FFBD task decomposition used. The FFBD 
was used because the subsequent steps of classifying the task’s basic HEP required the 
task to be in its simplest form for ease of classification. However, this was not a strong 
argument for the advantage of HEART over RAW as the HEART technique used the 
FFBD from the PFMECA analysis for the HEART task decomposition method.  
For step 3, generate hazards, the HEART analysis is a more comprehensive 
approach in terms of considering the EPCs, when compared to RAW. With available 
reference lists of generic tasks and error producing conditions, the analyst was able to 
analyze the probability of human error for each task in a more in-depth manner than the 
approach used in RAW. For example, RAW identified four hazards for the operational 
activity of disposing tracks, namely RAW.22 to RAW.25. Three of these were human 
error-producing conditions specific to lifting the tracks. On the other hand, the HEART 
technique was able to generate eight human error-producing conditions. These were all 
derived from the reference list: “unfamiliarity” with task and context, time shortage, 
misperception of risks, inexperienced personnel, inadequate checking, impoverished 
information, physical capabilities or the lack thereof, and low loading.  
Another advantage that HEART has over RAW in the hazard generation step is 
that HEART can consider all the listed human error-producing conditions together, 
combine these conditions, and assess the overall probability of a human committing an 
error for the specific task of lifting tracks. However, for RAW, there would be three 
separate risk levels. In this aspect, HEART provided the extra flexibility for the analyst to 
determine the overall riskiest operational task, and also the ability to zoom into the details 
when required. 
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For step 4, assess risk hazard level, the HEART technique also was better able to 
prioritize the risk levels associated with each task as it utilizes probabilistic assessment of 
the risk levels instead of generic risk matrices used in RAW. Twenty-one out of 25 
hazards identified by RAW had HIGH risk. On the other hand, the 47 error probabilities 
produced by HEART analysis were spread out across a wide range (0.000404 to 0.922). 
D. DISCUSSION—HEART VS. PFMECA RESULTS 
Table 21 shows the comparison of the top operational tasks that were identified to 
be the most probable to generate the failures due to human error. The author listed the top 
riskiest tasks in PFMECA and grouped them according to their tasks. For example, the 
author grouped PFMECA.167 and PFMECA.168 together under their common task, 
6.4.2, “Torque Nut.” The author then showed the corresponding HEART HEP and 
analysis results next to the PFMECA tasks.  
Table 21 shows that all of the riskiest tasks identified by PFMECA were also 
identified by HEART. In fact, it could be seen that the riskiest tasks identified by 
PFMECA were also flagged as the most risky tasks in HEART. This shows that, in the 
context of this work process, both HEART and PFMECA were able to generate similar 
results, albeit through different hazard generation and assessment approaches. However, 
the different hazard generation and assessment approaches were the main reason why the 
PFMECA technique is more suited to the SAF. Table 21 also shows that the PFMECA 
technique allows the analyst, in this case the author, to parse through each task and list 
the failure modes, effects, and potential causes, and determine the overall risk for each of 
the potential causes. This is especially useful for the SAF, where the junior officers 
would be able to follow the thought process and understand clearly the hazards involved. 
The opposite is true for the HEART process. The thought process was not explicitly clear 
and apparent to a layman.
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execution as a result 
of confusion during 
coordination from 
miscommunication 
432 0.9030528 3 
 Time shortage













head to shaft 
Failure of the 
sledgehammer 
due to the head 
being dislodged 
from the shaft as a 
result of poor 
securing 
Time constraints 
















































Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 





sustained due to 
sledgehammer 
swing missing the 
drift pin and 
hitting somebody 























































































































































Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 







sustained due to 
sledgehammer 
swing missing the 
drift pin and 
hitting somebody 
Time constraints 




3.3.8 Hit Shoe PFMECA.113 
Loosely secured 
sledgehammer 
head to shaft 
Failure of the 
sledgehammer 
due to the head 
being dislodged 
from the shaft as a 
result of poor 
securing 
Time constraints 















(Repeated task—Same as 
3.3.2) 
































































































































































3.3.8 Hit Shoe PFMECA.120 
Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 







sustained due to 
sledgehammer 
swing missing the 
drift pin and 
hitting somebody 
Insufficient training 432 
3.3.8 Hit Shoe PFMECA.121 
Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 







sustained due to 
sledgehammer 
swing missing the 






6.4.2 Torque nut PFMECA.168 
Failure to use a 
calibrated 
torque wrench  
Nut not torqued to 
specified value 
Time constraints 












6.4.2 Torque nut PFMECA.167 
Failure to use a 
calibrated 
torque wrench  
Nut not torqued to 
specified value 
Distractions leading







Failure to wait 





the vehicle may 
cause collision or 
Insufficient training 
leading to skipping 
of steps 
432 0.887639412 6 
 Unfamiliarity
 Time shortage


























































































































































One key difference between HEART and PFMECA is that HEART considers the 
risks based on the probability of human error for the task as a whole, while PFMECA 
generates the risks based on a single failure mode and cause in the context of the task. 
While HEART generated 47 human error probabilities, PFMECA generated 200 failure 
causes for analysis. With a single human error probability for each operational task, this 
significantly drives down the number of the results generated by the HEART technique 
and makes for an easier assessment and analysis. More importantly, the HEART 
technique produces the overall probability of human error from the combination of all 
possible error-producing conditions. On the other hand, the PFMECA generates single 
failure modes, which may be an oversimplification of human error probabilities. 
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VII. CASE STUDY
The previous chapters of the thesis demonstrated the pros and cons of the RAW, 
modified PFMECA, and HEART methodologies to evaluate all AFV track replacement 
tasks. This chapter uses these RAW, PFMECA, and HEART analysis results to determine 
whether any of these methodologies would pick up the hazards and causes of hazards that 
led to an actual prior workshop incident documented by the SAF as a case study. 
Appendix D shows the workshop incident case study. With this comparison, the author 
then determined the effectiveness of each of the analysis techniques for this case study. 
At this point, it would be premature to generalize the results of this case study to include 
applicability to all other cases. 
A. BRIEF SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP INCIDENT 
The case study described technicians performing the work process to remove one 
side of an AFV track. At the time of the incident, the technician was using a 
sledgehammer to hit the drift pin to remove a track pin from the AFV’s track. The track 
pin was about 75 percent driven out of its socket. During one of the last few swings of the 
sledgehammer to hit the drift pin, the technician misjudged the swing and missed the drift 
pin. As the swing momentum was not stopped by the drift pin and the friction between 
the track pin and its socket, the technician’s swing momentum brought his hand to hit the 
sprocket wheel teeth located in the full swing path. As a result, he suffered crush injuries 
that caused partial deformity and broken nail on his right index finger.  
The case study attributed the cause to the technician’s eagerness to expedite the 
task for the impending audit. He rushed through the task, causing himself to misjudge and 
injure himself. The exact motivation behind his eagerness to complete the task was not 
immediately revealed in this case study. Hence, it would be speculative to focus on 
comparing his motivation as the failure cause. Therefore, the examination of this case 
study focuses on the failure cause of “rushing through the task,” which would provide a 
clearer basis of comparison. 
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B. COMPARISON OF RAW, PFEMCA, AND HEART 
Using the RAW analysis, the author failed to single out the task of removing the 
drift pin from the track of the AFV. Table 22 shows the RAW analysis associated with 
breaking track. The closest task was breaking track, which encompassed a large range of 
tasks. Hence, the supervisor, in this case a junior officer, would find it difficult to 
determine which task required closer supervision or more detailed reminders to the 
technician executing the task.  






 Identify Hazards 






Man. Poor communication 
between personnel 
working together Critical Likely High 
RAW.10 Man. Inadequate skillset for the task Critical Occasional High 
RAW.11 Man. Under stress to complete the task quickly Critical Occasional High 
RAW.12 Man. Reckless attitude Critical Occasional High 
RAW.13 
Management. Insufficient 
rest time in between 
activities Critical Occasional High 
RAW.14 Machine. Vehicle may malfunction Critical Seldom 
Medi
um 
Under the broad task of breaking track, the RAW technique was able to identify 
the described cause to a certain degree of accuracy. The case study described that the 
technician was too eager to complete the task for the impending audit. He rushed through 
the task, causing himself to misjudge and injure himself. The cause of his eagerness to 
complete the task for the impending audit was not described. In addition, there might 
have been other possible contributors to this accident. For example, his supervisor might 
have exerted pressure on him to expedite the task execution, someone could have 
distracted him for that instant, or his mind could have been distracted by problems at 
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home. However, this thesis does not focus on determining other possible contributors.1 
This event had a common denominator, which was an imposed time constraint, either 
self-imposed or imposed by the audit schedule, that motivated the technician’s rushed 
actions. The closest explanation was RAW.11. RAW.11 describes the hazard as one of 
the 5-M factors, “Man,” where the personnel at risk could be under a time constraint and, 
hence, stressed to complete the task quickly.  
PFMECA analysis was able to identify the case study incident described. Through 
task decomposition, PFMECA was able to identify the specific task, “remove track pin 
from used track shoes,” and its specific subtask 3.3.2, “Drive track pin partly free.” Table 
23 shows the PFMECA analysis of the said sub-task. These are the same RPN and 
ranking values created in the original analysis. The analysis further broke down the 
potential failure modes into five different causes, one of which properly described the 
case study workshop incident. This was listed as “Failure to hit drift pin with 
sledgehammer due to lack of control (inexperience, overconfidence, insufficient strength 
or time constraint).” The associated failure effect was “crush injuries sustained due to 
sledgehammer swing missing the drift pin and hitting somebody.” In the case study, the 
technician hit himself.  




Failure Mode Failure Effects 
Potential Causes of 





head to shaft 
Failure of the 
sledgehammer due to the 
head being dislodged 
from the shaft as a result 
of poor securing 
Loosely secured 
sledgehammer head 
to shaft due to wear 







head to shaft 
Failure of the 
sledgehammer due to the 
head being dislodged 
from the shaft as a result 
of poor securing 
Inexperience leading 
to failure to carry out 
evaluation 
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1 This analysis is based on the written case study available. Any inaccuracies or misinterpretations 
inherent in the case study would be reflected in the analysis performed in this section. It is not the intent of 
this thesis to examine the flaws of this case study, but rather to match the case study results with PFMECA, 





Failure Mode Failure Effects 
Potential Causes of 





head to shaft 
Failure of the 
sledgehammer due to the 
head being dislodged 
from the shaft as a result 
of poor securing 
Time constraints 








drift Pin and/or 
socket  
Failure of the drift pin 
due to material stress 
defect, resulting in the 
shattering of the drift pin 
upon impact with 
sledgehammer 
Material stress 












Strain injuries sustained 
due to unfamiliarity with 
sledgehammer weight 














Strain injuries sustained 
due to unfamiliarity with 
sledgehammer weight 
















Strain injuries sustained 
due to unfamiliarity with 
sledgehammer weight 





sleep and/or rest 
144 102 
PFMECA.104 
Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 






Crush injuries sustained 
due to sledgehammer 
swing missing the drift 
pin and hitting 
somebody 
Negligence or 





Failure Mode Failure Effects 
Potential Causes of 
Failure RPN Rank 
PFMECA.105 
Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 






Crush injuries sustained 
due to sledgehammer 
swing missing the drift 
pin and hitting 
somebody 
Insufficient training 432 3 
PFMECA.106 
Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 






Crush injuries sustained 
due to sledgehammer 
swing missing the drift 
pin and hitting 
somebody 
Time constraints 





Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 






Crush injuries sustained 
due to sledgehammer 
swing missing the drift 









Failure to keep 
clear of the 
track shoe and 
sledgehammer 
trajectories 
Crush injuries sustained 
Inexperience leading 




PFMECA analysis was also able to identify the cause of failure for this sub-task 
to a certain degree. Using the PFMECA technique, the author identified the following 
potential failure causes: 
 negligence and/or overconfidence
 insufficient training
 time constraints leading to rushed actions causing misalignment errors
 reduced psychomotor coordination from insufficient sleep and/or rest
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The PFMECA analysis was able to identify the described cause with a certain 
degree of accuracy. Similar to that described earlier, time constraints shaped the behavior 
of the technician. Therefore, PFMECA was able to identify the failure cause of the time 
constraints leading to rushed actions causing misalignment errors.  
Furthermore, PFMECA analysis assigned four of the failure causes associated 
with the “Drive track pin partly free” sub-task to RPN values greater than 400, ranking 
them among the top risks. Among them, the failure cause of time constraints had an RPN 
value of 432.  
When HEART analysis utilized the same task decomposition method, it was able 
to identify the task involved in the case study incident. In addition, the HEART analysis 
also singled out the sub-task as the riskiest task, with a probability of human error 
assessed at 0.92. Table 24 shows the HEART analysis for the sub-task. Evidently, time 
shortage was the biggest contributor to the final HEP value.  






















0.12 Unfamiliarity 17 0.01 1.16 
0.92199141 
0.12 Time shortage 11 0.3 4
0.12 Misperception of risks 4 0.05 1.15
0.12 Inexperienced Personnel 3 0.1 1.2
0.12 Inadequate checking 3 0.05 1.1
0.12 Unreliable instruments 1.5 0.01 1.005
0.12 Physical capabilities 1.4 0.2 1.08
0.12 Low loading 1.1 0.05 1.005
Both PFMECA and HEART analysis were effective in identifying both the task 
involved and the hazard. In addition, both methods were able to single out the task and/or 
hazard as one that stood out from the rest, allowing them to be isolated for targeted 
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remedial actions. On the other hand, RAW analysis was not able to identify the task 
involved. Although RAW analysis was able to identify the hazard involved, this might 
not have helped much because the supervisor would not know on which task he should 
prioritize his focus.  
This case study showed that the PFMECA technique is easier than the HEART 
technique for the layman to follow and enables the layman to track the failure causes to 
the operational activity. This is especially important in the SAF where the majority of the 
supervisors are junior officers who may lack operational experience. With an easy-to-
follow, comprehensive set of hazard analyses, the supervisor can appreciate and 
internalize better the full nuances of the work process and the hazards involved.   
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VIII. RECOMMENDATION
The RAW technique is a useful risk assessment technique for the SAF as it is 
applicable across all scenarios, from training activities like physical proficiency tests to 
tactical operations in combat missions. This is because it is simple to understand and use, 
and it provides a quick method of assessing risks. This is advantageous in operations 
where planning and risk assessment times are constrained and leaders must quickly make 
risk assessments under dynamic conditions. Therefore, in such scenarios, PFEMCA and 
HEART analysis techniques are not viable as they are too time consuming. For other 
operations, such as maintenance work processes where surrounding conditions are static, 
and planning and risk assessment times are not constrained, the SAF would be better 
served by a more comprehensive alternative to reduce injury risks. A more 
comprehensive alternative has the potential to identify more hazards and allow for 
recommending and implementing appropriate mitigation control measures to enhance 
safety and minimize injuries in the organization. 
Both the PFMECA and the HEART analysis methods were more effective than 
RAW in hazard risk analysis. In addition, both PFMECA and HEART were equally 
effective at identifying the top risks. However, PFMECA would be a more useful tool for 
SAF. This is because SAF is using the FMECA technique currently, a variant of the 
PFMECA technique. Hence, the incumbents in the organization would be familiar with 
the use of the tool.  
The layout of the PFMECA template and the intuitive logic flow allows personnel 
using the PFMECA technique to easily learn and apply the technique. Furthermore, they 
can easily trace and follow the logic to deriving the results of the PFMECA. The reports 
generated through using PFMECA have a more logical flow and allow junior officers to 
understand fully the operational activity and the risks involved.  
On the other hand, the HEART technique requires additional material like a 
Generic Task List and an EPC reference list to facilitate hazard analysis. The added 
requirement to understand the material may make the HEART technique difficult to 
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implement in the SAF due to tight training schedules and frequent rotation of new 
leaders. As such, the junior officers would have fewer barriers to overcome when using 
the PFMECA risk analysis tool.   
PFMECA is also a flexible tool to adopt and apply to both technical systems. 
Many SAF operational activities include the close interaction of technical systems with 
human operators. While this thesis focuses on the human aspect of the operational 
activity, it is difficult to uncouple the technical systems from the human activities. Since 
the HEART analysis is not suitable to analyze technical systems, the PFMECA technique 
is preferred to achieve commonality of tools for hazard analysis of operational activities 
that require seamless integration of technical systems with human operators. 
This research recommends that SAF embark on a one-time effort to select 
operations and work processes that are generally static. One area on which to focus 
would be maintenance work processes. Teams of subject matter experts could carry out a 
one-time risk assessment using PFMECA technique and promulgate the results as 
training safety regulations for all to reference. Singapore Armed Forces could continue 
using RAW as a secondary assessment method for leaders to assess the situation on the 
ground, right before the execution of work processes, for any new hazards that may arise 
due to changing conditions. 
69
IX. CONCLUSION
PFMECA is a tried-and-tested technique for systematically deconstructing and 
identifying critical failure modes and causes in technical systems and manufacturing 
processes. This thesis applied the PFMECA technique to human work processes in the 
context of armored fighting vehicle maintenance and compared the results to those 
generated by a well-known HRA technique, HEART. In this context, the PFMECA was 
able to identify riskiest tasks within the work processes. However, a key shortcoming of 
the PFMECA was revealed when it could not identify the risks caused by a combination 
of failure causes and/or modes. Despite this, the PFMECA technique was able to identify 
a significant number of the risky tasks singled out by HEART for this work process.  
When compared to the original RAW technique, PFMECA is a better way of 
forcing the practitioner to think through the entire process down to the individual task 
level and to visualize the possible failure modes and causes. Since the PFMECA is 
recommended to be conducted by a team of subject matter experts, the risk assessment 
report created by the subject matter experts would prove useful for the soldier on the 
ground. This is because the soldier on the ground is typically a drafted soldier with little 
or no prior exposure and limited experience, this comprehensive breakdown and analysis 
would be very useful for him to boost his knowledge and heighten is alertness. This is 
especially useful in an organization that is very sensitive to any safety lapses.  
PFMECA is a tedious analysis method and would take considerable effort to 
complete. Therefore, it should be applied to work processes or activities that are 
generally static in nature. Furthermore, it would be most practical to conduct PFMECA 
as a one-time project and archive the results as templates for the future reference of all 
SAF leaders.  
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X. FUTURE WORK 
This thesis assumed that there would be minimal failures in the design of the 
technical system, and thus the risk analysis of the technical system would be outside the 
scope of this study. Future work could be done to further expand this study to include the 
failures at the component levels and the interactions between components and human 
actions.  
This thesis was a feasibility study on the possibility of using PFMECA and 
HEART analysis techniques as an alternate primary assessment technique to identify 
risks. However, this was only compared with one case study. More extensive research 
needs to be done to further validate the results. Future work could be done to examine 
more accident case studies to ensure that the conclusions from this thesis are consistent 
with the results of the other case studies. 
The PFMECA technique’s key limitation in the context of this work process is 
that it focused on single failure modes rather than failure mode combinations. Future 
studies could attempt to find ways to improve the PFMECA technique to address this 
issue. One possible method would be to use this in conjunction with Hazard and 
Operability (HAZOP) study analysis. The HAZOP analysis is a generic analysis tool that 
is potentially easy to use and allows for analysis of failure mode combinations on top of 
single failure modes. 
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APPENDIX A. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY AND TASK DECOMPOSITION  
Table 25 displays the operational activities and tasks involved in performing the work process of replacing one side of the 
AFV track, and the personnel required. 




















Personal Protective Equipment  is assumed for all 
activities 


















2.2 Start Engine 
2.2.1 Soundhorn Nil 
1x Crew (Driver) 
2x Technicians 
(Front & Rear 


























2.3.1 Release handbrake Nil   
2.3.2 Select gear Nil Move gear selector to “Drive” 











Nil   






Nil   
2.4.2 Select gear Nil Move gear selector to “Neutral” 
2.5 Stop Engine 






















Nil   

















Nil   























Nil     









Loosen but do not remove bleed valve on track 
adjuster and allow grease to flow out 
3.2.2 Check tension Pencil 
Place pencil between track and rear support roller. 
When pencil will fit between track and rear support 





















3.2.4 Clean valve 
Wiping 





















Remove nut from track pin to be removed. The 









Drive track pin partly free with short end of drift pin 








Drive track pin further out with medium end of drift 
pin 
3.3.5 Remove Drift pin Nil   
3.3.6 
Drive track 





Drive track pin all the way out with long end of drift 
pin 
3.3.7 Remove Drift pin Nil Keep medium end up and remove drift pin 
3.3.8 Hit Shoe Sledge Hammer To break track, hit track shoe from inside of track 



























Nil   
4.2 Start Engine 
4.2.1 Sound horn Nil 
1x Crew (Driver) 
2x Technicians 
(Front & Rear 
Guides) 
  















4.3.1 Release handbrake Nil   
4.3.2 Select gear Nil Move gear selector to “Reverse” 





























Nil   
4.4.2 Select gear Nil Move gear selector to “Neutral” 
4.5 Stop Engine 











Nil   

















Nil   
5.0 Dispose old track 5.1 
Remove 


















Remove nut from track pin to be removed. The 




















Drive track pin partly free with short end of drift pin 








Drive track pin further out with medium end of drift 
pin 
5.1.5 Remove drift pin Nil   
5.1.6 
Drive track 





Drive track pin all the way out with long end of drift 
pin 
5.1.7 Remove drift pin Nil Keep medium end up and remove drift pin 
5.1.8 Hit shoe Sledge Hammer To break track, hit track shoe from inside of track 
5.2 Shift track links 
5.2.1 Lift track links 
Trolley 8x Technicians working in pairs 
Lift OLD track links and track pins from ground 






















5.2.5 Position track links 
Lay track links and track pins onto pallets in 
disposal cage 
6.0 Form Track 
6.1 Shift track links 
6.1.1 Lift track links 
Trolley 8x Technicians working in pairs 
Lift NEW track links and track pins from pallets 
(seven pieces of track shoes joined together) 










Lift track links and track pins from trolley 
6.1.5 Position track links 
Lay track links and track pins in one straight line in 




















Remove nut from track pin to be removed. The 









Drive track pin partly free with short end of drift pin 





















6.2.5 Removedrift pin Nil 
6.2.6 
Drive track 





Drive track pin all the way out with long end of drift 
pin 
6.2.7 Removedrift pin Nil Keep medium end up and remove drift pin 
6.2.8 Hit shoe Sledge Hammer To break track, hit track shoe from inside of track 
6.3 Join trackshoes 
6.3.1 Join two track links Nil
8x Technicians 
working in pairs 
Join two track links together - The track pin holes of 
the end of one track link should be aligned to that of 
the other track link 
6.3.2 Installtrack pin Hammer 


















































7.2 Start Engine 
7.2.1 Soundhorn Nil 
1x Crew (Driver) 
2x Technicians 
(Front & Rear 
Guides) 















7.3.1 Release handbrake Nil
7.3.2 Select gear Nil Move gear selector to “Drive” 






















Nil   






Nil   
7.4.2 Select gear Nil Move gear selector to “Neutral” 
7.5 Stop Engine 











Nil   










































8.2.1 Insert track pin Nil 
3x Technicians 












Lever crowbar against ground and track to hold 
track against sprocket. Remove track pin at end of 
activity 
9.0 Position Vehicle 

















Nil   
9.2 Start Engine 9.2.1 Sound horn Nil 
1x Crew (Driver) 












9.2.2 Select gear Nil 
(Front & Rear 















9.3.1 Release handbrake Nil   
9.3.2 Select gear Nil Move gear selector to “Reverse” 











Nil   






Nil   
9.4.2 Select gear Nil Move gear selector to “Neutral” 






















Nil   

















Nil   










10.2.1 Insert track pin Nil 
3x Technicians 












Lever crowbar against ground and track to hold 










Nil Nil Track Fixtures 1x Technician 
Position hooks same distance apart at ends of two 




























Install track fixture on outside of track. Place hooks 









Install track fixture on inside of track. Place hooks 





1 3/8 inch 
open end 
wrench 
Tighten two track fixtures evenly 
11.2.5 Check gap 6-inch ruler 












11.3.2 Insert drift pin 
Sledge 
Hammer 
1 3/8 inch 
open end 
wrench 
Tap long end of drift pin through track pin holes to 










Have helper hold track about 1 1/12 inches from 
track fixture using crowbar 
11.3.4 Install track pin Hammer 
From inside of track, install track pin in track pin 
hole. As helper aligns track pin holes with crowbar, 
























Install and tighten nut on track pin until one full 
thread shows on track pin 
















1 3/8 inch 
open end 
wrench 1x Technician 










12.1 Check tracktension Nil Nil Nil 1x Technician 
Reach under bolt-on armor and try to turn rear 
support roller 
1. If rear support roller does not turn freely, track is
too loose 
2. If rear support roller turns freely, try to pass
index finger between track and rear support roller. If 
finger passes, track is too tight; else tension is okay 
and no adjustment needed 




rag 2x Technicians 
Clean all dirt from grease fitting on track adjuster 



















Place grease gun nozzle on grease fitting, and pump 






Place pencil between track and rear support roller. 
When pencil will fit between track and rear support 
roller but index finger will not, stop adding grease 
12.2.4 Clean valve 
Wiping 
rag 
Stop pumping grease, remove grease gun nozzle 
from grease fitting. Wipe away excess grease 









Loosen but do not remove bleed valve on track 
adjuster and allow grease to flow out 
12.3.2 Check tension Pencil 
Place pencil between track and rear support roller. 
When pencil will fit between track and rear support 










12.3.4 Clean valve 
Wiping 
rag Wipe away spilled grease 































13.2 Start Engine 
13.2.1 Sound horn Nil 
1x Crew (Driver) 
2x Technicians 
(Front & Rear 
Guides) 
  















13.3.1 Release handbrake Nil   
13.3.2 Select gear Nil Move gear selector to “Drive”/”Reverse” 











Nil   






Nil   












13.5 Stop Engine 











Nil   



























The following figures display the fully worked FFBD. 
 








Figure 11.  An Enlarged View of the Work Process FFBD (Phase 2). 
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Figure 12.  An Enlarged View of the Work Process FFBD (Phase 3). 
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Figure 13.  An Enlarged View of the Work Process FFBD (Phases 4 and 5). 
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With reference to Table 25, the subtasks are also relevant to subfunctions describing operational activities 2.0, 4.0, 7.0, 9.0, and 
13.0. 
 
Figure 16.  Subtasks Describing Subfunction 3.1. 
 
Figure 17.  Subtasks Describing Subfunction 3.2. 




Figure 18.  Subtasks Describing Subfunction 3.3. 
With reference to Table 25, the subtasks are also relevant to subfunctions describing operational activities 5.1 and 6.2.  
 
Figure 19.  Subtasks Describing Subfunction 6.2. 




Figure 20.  Subtasks Describing Subfunction 7.3. 
 
Figure 21.  Subtasks Describing Subfunction 7.4. 




Figure 22.  Subtasks Describing Subfunction 8.2. 
With reference to Table 25, the subtasks are also relevant to subfunctions describing operational activity 10.2.  
 





Figure 24.  Subtasks Describing Subfunction 11.3. 
 























APPENDIX B. WORKED PFMECA 
This is the worked solution of the PFMECA for the stated work process of 
replacing a set of track links in the Armored Fighting Vehicle. The analysis result was too 
large to be displayed as one coherent table. Hence, it is broken down into two separate 
tables. Table 26 shows the operational activities and their corresponding list of PFMECA 
Identity numbers, called PFMECA.ID. Table 27 links the PFMECA.ID with the failure 
modes, effects, and criticality analysis. “Nil” entry in these tables mean that the previous 
task or operational activity had been decomposed to the simplest form. For example, in 
Table 26, there was no Level 3 sub-task for the “Identify Area of Operations (AO)” 
operational task because the author deemed that task to be at its simplest form for further 
analysis.  
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Table 26.   Full List of Operational Activities and Corresponding PFMECA 
Level1 Operational Activities Level2 Operational Tasks Level3 Sub-tasks Failure Mode ID 
1.0 Secure Area 1.1 Identify Area of Operations (AO) Nil Nil PFMECA.1 
1.0 Secure Area 1.1 Identify Area of Operations (AO) Nil Nil PFMECA.2 
1.0 Secure Area 1.1 Identify Area of Operations (AO) Nil Nil PFMECA.3 
1.0 Secure Area 1.1 Identify Area of Operations (AO) Nil Nil PFMECA.4 
1.0 Secure Area 1.1 Identify Area of Operations (AO) Nil Nil PFMECA.5 
1.0 Secure Area 1.1 Identify Area of Operations (AO) Nil Nil PFMECA.6 
1.0 Secure Area 1.1 Identify Area of Operations (AO) Nil Nil PFMECA.7 
1.0 Secure Area 1.1 Identify Area of Operations (AO) Nil Nil PFMECA.8 
1.0 Secure Area 1.1 Identify Area of Operations (AO) Nil Nil PFMECA.9 
1.0 Secure Area 1.1 Identify Area of Operations (AO) Nil Nil PFMECA.10 
1.0 Secure Area 1.1 Identify Area of Operations (AO) Nil Nil PFMECA.11 
1.0 Secure Area 1.1 Identify Area of Operations (AO) Nil Nil PFMECA.12 
1.0 Secure Area 1.2 Cordon off area Nil Nil PFMECA.13 
1.0 Secure Area 1.2 Cordon off area Nil Nil PFMECA.14 
1.0 Secure Area 1.2 Cordon off area Nil Nil PFMECA.15 
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Level1 Operational Activities Level2 Operational Tasks Level3 Sub-tasks Failure Mode ID 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.1 Enter Vehicle 2.1.1 Climb onto top of vehicle PFMECA.16 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.1 Enter Vehicle 2.1.1 Climb onto top of vehicle PFMECA.17 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.1 Enter Vehicle 2.1.1 Climb onto top of vehicle PFMECA.18 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.1 Enter Vehicle 2.1.1 Climb onto top of vehicle PFMECA.19 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.1 Enter Vehicle 2.1.2 Open driver’s hatch PFMECA.20 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.1 Enter Vehicle 2.1.2 Open driver’s hatch PFMECA.21 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.1 Enter Vehicle 2.1.2 Open driver’s hatch PFMECA.22 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.1 Enter Vehicle 2.1.2 Open driver’s hatch PFMECA.23 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.1 Enter Vehicle 2.1.2 Open driver’s hatch PFMECA.24 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.1 Enter Vehicle 2.1.3 Climb into driver’s seat PFMECA.25 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.1 Enter Vehicle 2.1.3 Climb into driver’s seat PFMECA.26 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.1 Sound horn PFMECA.27 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.1 Sound horn PFMECA.28 
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Level1 Operational Activities Level2 Operational Tasks Level3 Sub-tasks Failure Mode ID 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.1 Sound horn PFMECA.29 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.1 Sound horn PFMECA.30 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.2 Select gear PFMECA.31 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.2 Select gear PFMECA.32 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.2 Select gear PFMECA.33 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.2 Select gear PFMECA.34 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.2 Select gear PFMECA.35 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.3 Press “Start” Button PFMECA.36 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.3 Press “Start” Button PFMECA.37 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.4 Check no warning lights PFMECA.38 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.4 Check no warning lights PFMECA.39 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.4 Check no warning lights PFMECA.40 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.4 Check no warning lights PFMECA.41 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.4 Check no warning lights PFMECA.42 
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Level1 Operational Activities Level2 Operational Tasks Level3 Sub-tasks Failure Mode ID 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.4 Check no warning lights PFMECA.43 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.2 Start Engine 2.2.4 Check no warning lights PFMECA.44 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.1 Release handbrake PFMECA.45 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.1 Release handbrake PFMECA.46 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.1 Release handbrake PFMECA.47 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.1 Release handbrake PFMECA.48 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.1 Release handbrake PFMECA.49 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.1 Release handbrake PFMECA.50 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.4 Manipulate brake and accelerator pedals PFMECA.51 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.4 Manipulate brake and accelerator pedals PFMECA.52 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.4 Manipulate brake and accelerator pedals PFMECA.53 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.5 Manipulate steering yokes PFMECA.54 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.5 Manipulate steering yokes PFMECA.55 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.5 Manipulate steering yokes PFMECA.56 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.5 Manipulate steering yokes PFMECA.57 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.5 Manipulate steering yokes PFMECA.58 
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Level1 Operational Activities Level2 Operational Tasks Level3 Sub-tasks Failure Mode ID 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.5 Manipulate steering yokes PFMECA.59 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.5 Manipulate steering yokes PFMECA.60 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.5 Manipulate steering yokes PFMECA.61 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.5 Manipulate steering yokes PFMECA.62 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.5 Manipulate steering yokes PFMECA.63 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.5 Manipulate steering yokes PFMECA.64 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.5 Stop Engine 2.5.2 Turn off fuel control PFMECA.65 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.5 Stop Engine 2.5.2 Turn off fuel control PFMECA.66 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.5 Stop Engine 2.5.2 Turn off fuel control PFMECA.67 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.5 Stop Engine 2.5.3 Turn off master power switch PFMECA.68 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.5 Stop Engine 2.5.3 Turn off master power switch PFMECA.69 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.5 Stop Engine 2.5.3 Turn off master power switch PFMECA.70 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.6 Exit Vehicle 2.6.1 Climb out of driver’s hatch PFMECA.71 
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Level1 Operational Activities Level2 Operational Tasks Level3 Sub-tasks Failure Mode ID 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.6 Exit Vehicle 2.6.1 Climb out of driver’s hatch PFMECA.72 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.6 Exit Vehicle 2.6.1 Climb out of driver’s hatch PFMECA.73 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.6 Exit Vehicle 2.6.1 Climb out of driver’s hatch PFMECA.74 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.6 Exit Vehicle 2.6.2 Close driver’s hatch PFMECA.75 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.6 Exit Vehicle 2.6.2 Close driver’s hatch PFMECA.76 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.6 Exit Vehicle 2.6.2 Close driver’s hatch PFMECA.77 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.6 Exit Vehicle 2.6.3 Climb down vehicle PFMECA.78 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.6 Exit Vehicle 2.6.3 Climb down vehicle PFMECA.79 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.6 Exit Vehicle 2.6.3 Climb down vehicle PFMECA.80 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.6 Exit Vehicle 2.6.3 Climb down vehicle PFMECA.81 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.6 Exit Vehicle 2.6.3 Climb down vehicle PFMECA.82 
3.0 Break Track 3.1 Unstow track fixtures & drift pin 3.1.2 Remove track fixtures & drift pin PFMECA.83 
3.0 Break Track 3.2 Loosen track tension 3.2.1 Loosen bleed valve PFMECA.84 
3.0 Break Track 3.2 Loosen track tension 3.2.1 Loosen bleed valve PFMECA.85 
3.0 Break Track 3.2 Loosen track tension 3.2.1 Loosen bleed valve PFMECA.86 
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Level1 Operational Activities Level2 Operational Tasks Level3 Sub-tasks Failure Mode ID 
3.0 Break Track 3.2 Loosen track tension 3.2.2 Check tension PFMECA.87 
3.0 Break Track 3.2 Loosen track tension 3.2.4 Clean valve PFMECA.88 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.1 Remove nut from track pin PFMECA.89 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.1 Remove nut from track pin PFMECA.90 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.1 Remove nut from track pin PFMECA.91 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.1 Remove nut from track pin PFMECA.92 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.1 Remove nut from track pin PFMECA.93 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.1 Remove nut from track pin PFMECA.94 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.1 Remove nut from track pin PFMECA.95 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.1 Remove nut from track pin PFMECA.96 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free PFMECA.97 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free PFMECA.98 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free PFMECA.99 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free PFMECA.100 
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3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free PFMECA.101 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free PFMECA.102 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free PFMECA.103 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free PFMECA.104 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free PFMECA.105 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free PFMECA.106 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free PFMECA.107 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.2 Drive track pin partly free PFMECA.108 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.3 Remove drift pin PFMECA.109 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.5 Remove drift pin PFMECA.110 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.7 Remove drift pin PFMECA.111 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.8 Hit shoe PFMECA.112 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.8 Hit shoe PFMECA.113 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.8 Hit shoe PFMECA.114 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.8 Hit shoe PFMECA.115 
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3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.8 Hit shoe PFMECA.116 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.8 Hit shoe PFMECA.117 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.8 Hit shoe PFMECA.118 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.8 Hit shoe PFMECA.119 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.8 Hit shoe PFMECA.120 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.8 Hit shoe PFMECA.121 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.8 Hit shoe PFMECA.122 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.8 Hit shoe PFMECA.123 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.1 Lift track links PFMECA.124 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.1 Lift track links PFMECA.125 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.1 Lift track links PFMECA.126 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.1 Lift track links PFMECA.127 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.1 Lift track links PFMECA.128 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.1 Lift track links PFMECA.129 
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5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.1 Lift track links PFMECA.130 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.1 Lift track links PFMECA.131 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.1 Lift track links PFMECA.132 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.1 Lift track links PFMECA.133 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.1 Lift track links PFMECA.134 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.1 Lift track links PFMECA.135 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.1 Lift track links PFMECA.136 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.1 Lift track links PFMECA.137 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.2 Put onto trolley PFMECA.138 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.2 Put onto trolley PFMECA.139 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.3 Push trolley to work area PFMECA.140 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.3 Push trolley to work area PFMECA.141 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.3 Push trolley to work area PFMECA.142 
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5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.3 Push trolley to work area PFMECA.143 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.3 Push trolley to work area PFMECA.144 
5.0 Dispose old track 5.2 Shift track links 5.2.3 Push trolley to work area PFMECA.145 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.1 Join two track links PFMECA.146 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.1 Join two track links PFMECA.147 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.1 Join two track links PFMECA.148 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.2 Install track pin PFMECA.149 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.2 Install track pin PFMECA.150 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.2 Install track pin PFMECA.151 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.2 Install track pin PFMECA.152 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.2 Install track pin PFMECA.153 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.2 Install track pin PFMECA.154 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.2 Install track pin PFMECA.155 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.2 Install track pin PFMECA.156 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.3 Install nut on track pin PFMECA.157 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.3 Install nut on track pin PFMECA.158 
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6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.3 Install nut on track pin PFMECA.159 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.3 Install nut on track pin PFMECA.160 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.3 Install nut on track pin PFMECA.161 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes 6.3.3 Install nut on track pin PFMECA.162 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes PFMECA.163 
6.0 Form Track 6.3 Join track shoes PFMECA.164 
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 
6.3.3   Install nut on track pin 
6.3.3 Install nut on track pin 
6.4.1   Mark nut for torquing PFMECA.165 
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut PFMECA.166 
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut PFMECA.167 
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut PFMECA.168 
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut PFMECA.169 
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut PFMECA.170 
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut PFMECA.171 
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut PFMECA.172 
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut PFMECA.173 
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.1 Check track guide position Nil Nil PFMECA.174 
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 8.2.1 Insert track pin PFMECA.175 
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8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 8.2.1 Insert track pin PFMECA.176 
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 8.2.2 Place track on sprocket PFMECA.177 
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 8.2.2 Place track on sprocket PFMECA.178 
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 8.2.2 Place track on sprocket PFMECA.179 
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 8.2.2 Place track on sprocket PFMECA.180 
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 8.2.2 Place track on sprocket PFMECA.181 
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 8.2.2 Place track on sprocket PFMECA.182 
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 8.2.2 Place track on sprocket PFMECA.183 
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 8.2.2 Place track on sprocket PFMECA.184 
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 8.2.2 Place track on sprocket PFMECA.185 
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 8.2.3 Maintain track propped position PFMECA.186 
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.2 Guide track over Sprocket 8.2.3 Maintain track propped position PFMECA.187 
11.0 Join Track  (while on vehicle) 11.1 Assemble Track fixtures Nil Nil PFMECA.188 
11.0 Join Track  (while on vehicle) 11.2 Install track fixtures 11.2.1 Move ends of track together PFMECA.189 
11.0 Join Track  (while on vehicle) 11.2 Install track fixtures 11.2.2 Install track fixture on outside of track PFMECA.190 
11.0 Join Track  (while on vehicle) 11.2 Install track fixtures 11.2.4 Tighten track fixtures PFMECA.191 
11.0 Join Track  (while on vehicle) 11.2 Install track fixtures 11.2.4 Tighten track fixtures PFMECA.192 
11.0 Join Track  (while on vehicle) 11.2 Install track fixtures 11.2.4 Tighten track fixtures PFMECA.193 
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11.0 Join Track  (while on vehicle) 11.2 Install track fixtures 11.2.4 Tighten track fixtures PFMECA.194 
11.0 Join Track  (while on vehicle) 11.2 Install track fixtures 11.2.5 Check gap PFMECA.195 
11.0 Join Track  (while on vehicle) 11.3 Join track shoes (while on vehicle) 11.3.2 Insert drift pin PFMECA.196 
11.0 Join Track  (while on vehicle) 11.3 Join track shoes (while on vehicle) 11.3.3 Maintain track pin hole alignment PFMECA.197 
11.0 Join Track  (while on vehicle) 11.5 Remove track fixtures 11.5.1 Loosen track fixtures PFMECA.198 
11.0 Join Track  (while on vehicle) 11.5 Remove track fixtures 11.5.1 Loosen track fixtures PFMECA.199 
11.0 Join Track  (while on vehicle) 11.5 Remove track fixtures 11.5.1 Loosen track fixtures PFMECA.200 






















cause of failure 
so that failure 











Failure to secure 
a sufficiently 
large AO for 
unimpeded 
operations 
Lead to need for 
complicated 
maneuvers in order 
to execute work 
process, increasing 























cause of failure 
so that failure 










thus safety risks 
PFMECA.
2 
Failure to secure 
a  sufficiently 
large AO for 
unimpeded 
operations 
Lead to need for 
complicated 
maneuvers in order 
to execute work 
process, increasing 
unfamiliarity and 











in the AO 
Lead to increased 
exposure to safety 
risks when executing 
work process 






in the AO 
Lead to increased 
exposure to safety 














in the AO 
Lead to increased 
exposure to safety 
risks when executing 
work process 
5 
Failure to carry out 
task due to 
workload (slip the 
mind) 























cause of failure 
so that failure 














in the AO 
Lead to increased 
exposure to safety 
risks when executing 
work process 
5 
Lack of training 
provided in 
identifying hazards 
7 Nil 4 140 113
PFMECA.
7 




Working in and/or 
immediately after 
inclement weather 
will increase slip 
risks, lightning strike 
risks 
8 Negligence or overconfidence 2 Nil 4 64 159
PFMECA.
8 




Working in and/or 
immediately after 
inclement weather 
will increase slip 


















Working under hot 
weather may lead to 
heat exhaustion 7 
Negligence or 
overconfidence 
causing failure to 
detect cues 
2 Nil 6 84 146
PFMECA.
10 




Working under hot 
weather may lead to 
heat exhaustion 7 
Inexperience 


































cause of failure 
so that failure 

















and exhaustion may 
cause increased 
safety risks in work 
process execution 
9 Negligence or overconfidence 2 Nil 6 108 130
PFMECA.
12 





and exhaustion may 
cause increased 






























intrusions of external 
parties may expose 
both external parties 
and the work crew to 
safety risks 























cause of failure 
so that failure 
























intrusions of external 
parties may expose 
both external parties 
and the work crew to 
safety risks 
5 Insufficient time due to workload 6 Nil 6 180 87
PFMECA.
15 











intrusions of external 
parties may expose 
both external parties 









































cause of failure 
so that failure 














Failure to gain 
proper footing 
on latches 
Fall from height (up 
to 2 meters), leading 
to fall injuries 9 
Slippery footholds 
due to presence of 











Failure to gain 
proper footing 
on latches 
Fall from height (up 
to 2 meters), leading 
to fall injuries 9 
Time constraints 













balance on top 
of the vehicle  
Fall from height (up 
to 2.6 meters), 




due to presence of 
water, oil, and/or 
grease 









may cause loss of 
balance 
8 Loose apparel 2 Nil 6 96 134
PFMECA.
20 
Failure to have a 
proper grip on 
the hatch 
Losing grip on hatch 
during opening. 
Hatch snapping back 
8 
Slippery hatch 
edge due to 
presence of water, 























cause of failure 
so that failure 









may hit personnel, 
leading to hit injury 
oil, and/or grease 
PFMECA.
21 
Failure to have a 
proper grip on 
the hatch 
Losing grip on hatch 
during opening. 
Hatch snapping back 
may hit personnel, 
leading to hit injury 








Failure to have a 
proper grip on 
the hatch 
Losing grip on hatch 
during opening. 
Hatch snapping back 
may hit personnel, 
leading to hit injury 












Open hatch not 
secured firmly to 
catch 
8 Faulty catch 2
Equipment 
Serviceability 








Open hatch not 




strength applied to 
the action of 










Failure to have 
controlled 
descent into the 
Slip and fall into 
confined space with 
many sharp objects, 
5 
Slippery footholds 
due to presence of 
water, oil, and/or 























cause of failure 
so that failure 









driver’s seat due 
to slippery steps 





Failure to have 
controlled 
descent into the 
driver’s seat due 
to slippery steps 
Slip and fall into 
confined space with 
many sharp objects, 







3 Nil 6 90 135
PFMECA.
27 
Failure of horn 
to sound 
Failure of horn to 










Failure of horn 
to sound 
Failure of horn to 
sound as demanded 9 
Inexperience 









Failure of horn 
to sound 
Failure of horn to 
sound as demanded 9 
Insufficient 
practice leading to 
slippage in 
memory 
5 Nil 8 360 23
PFMECA.
30 
Failure of horn 
to sound 
Failure of horn to 














Failure of gear 
to engage 
correct gear 
Failure of correct 



























cause of failure 
so that failure 













Failure of gear 
to engage 
correct gear 
Failure of correct 
gear to engage 9 
Fatigue leading to 







Failure of gear 
to engage 
correct gear 
Failure of correct 
gear to engage 9 
Time constraints 











Failure of gear 
to engage 
correct gear 
Failure of correct 





detected until it 
is too late (i.e., 
vehicle is 







Failure of gear 
to engage at all 
Failure of gear to 










vehicle to start 






























cause of failure 
so that failure 














vehicle to start 
Failure of vehicle to 



























Personnel fails to 
register warning 
lights 






Personnel fails to 
register warning 
lights 











leading to rushing 
of actions 












to loss of 
concentration 





Personnel fails to 









































sleep and/or rest 






Handbrakes fail to 
release 9 
Faulty hydraulic 






Handbrakes fail to 
release 9 
Rusty and/or stiff 






cause of failure 
so that failure 





























Handbrakes fail to 
release 9 
Time constraints 
leading to rushing 
of actions 










to loss of 
concentration 























cause of failure 
so that failure 











































4 144 102 
PFMECA.
51 
Failure to work 
accelerator 
pedals properly 
Unable to move 
vehicle smoothly 9 
Time constraints 
leading to rushing 
of actions 
6 Nil 6 324 38 
PFMECA.
52 
Failure to work 
accelerator 
pedals properly 
Unable to move 




would be sieved 
out during 
training course 
1 18 189 
PFMECA.
53 
Failure to work 
accelerator 
pedals properly 
Unable to move 













to engage due 
Steering yokes fail to 



























cause of failure 
so that failure 













Failure to heed 
ground guides’ 
instructions 





with ground guides 
due to different 
lingo (signals) used 




are taught a 











2 36 184 
PFMECA.
56 
Failure to heed 
ground guides’ 
instructions 





with ground guides 
due to reduced 











2 90 135 
PFMECA.
57 
Failure to heed 
ground guides’ 
instructions 






to insufficient field 




would be sieved 
out during 
training course 























cause of failure 
so that failure 











Failure to heed 
ground guides’ 
instructions 






causing a failure to 
double check 




ground guide to 
provide proper 
guidance 





with ground guides 
due to different 
lingo (signals) 





are taught a 















ground guide to 
provide proper 
guidance 




Wrong signals used 






(detection is not 
readily done) 




ground guide to 
provide proper 
guidance 





on the part of 






(detection is not 
readily done) 























cause of failure 
so that failure 












ground guide to 
provide proper 
guidance 





on the part of 









(detection is not 
readily done) 




ground guide to 
provide proper 
guidance 





on the part of 








(detection is not 
readily done) 




ground guide to 
provide proper 
guidance 






execution as a 








(detection is not 
readily done) 
6 432 3 
PFMECA.
65 
Failure to turn 
off fuel control  
Excessive exhaust 
may cause asthmatic 




leading to rushing 




Exhaust will be 
spewed. This is 
observable. But 
detection is 



























cause of failure 
so that failure 











Failure to turn 
off fuel control  
Excessive exhaust 
may cause asthmatic 




training leading to 





Exhaust will be 
spewed. This is 
observable. But 
detection is 




5 35 186 
PFMECA.
67 
Failure to turn 
off fuel control  
Excessive exhaust 
may cause asthmatic 





sleep and/or rest 
4 
Exhaust will be 
spewed. This is 
observable. But 
detection is 











Failure of master 
power switch to 
engage 
9 



















Failure of master 




training leading to 
slippage of mind 
1 
Engine will be 
emitting sound. 
This is 























cause of failure 
so that failure 
























Failure of master 





sleep and/or rest 
4 









5 180 87 
PFMECA.
71 
Failure to have 
controlled 
ascent out of 
driver’s seat 
Slip and fall into 
confined space with 
many sharp objects, 




due to presence of 





crew (not an 
included 
process) 
6 60 162 
PFMECA.
72 
Failure to have 
controlled 
ascent out of 
driver’s seat 
Slip and fall into 
confined space with 
many sharp objects, 




leading to rushing 
of actions 
6 Nil 6 180 87 
PFMECA.
73 
Failure to have 
controlled 
ascent out of 
Slip and fall into 
confined space with 
many sharp objects, 
5 
Overconfidence 
leading to skipping 
of steps beyond 























cause of failure 
so that failure 














Failure to have 
controlled 
ascent out of 
driver’s seat 
Slip and fall into 
confined space with 
many sharp objects, 










crew (not an 
included 
process) 






Getting hit may 
cause a loss of 
balance and lead to 
fall from heights 
8 
Using too much 
strength (judgment 
error) due to 
inexperience 






Getting hit may 
cause a loss of 
balance and lead to 
fall from heights 
8 
Losing grip while 
exerting force due 
to not wearing PPE 




remove hands in 
time 
Crushed fingers due 
to failure to close 
driver’s hatch in a 
controlled manner, 
causing the hatch’s 
downward 
momentum to crush 
the personnel’s 
fingers between the 






































cause of failure 
so that failure 











Failure to gain 
proper footing 




personnel to slip 
and fall from 
height 
Fall from height (up 
to 2 meters), leading 
to fall injuries 8 
Slippery footholds 
due to presence of 





crew (not an 
included 
process) 
6 144 102 
PFMECA.
79 
Failure to gain 
proper footing 




personnel to slip 
and fall from 
height 
Fall from height (up 
to 2 meters), leading 
to fall injuries 8 
Slippery surfaces 
due to presence of 





crew (not an 
included 
process) 





Fall from height (up 
to 2.6 meters), 
leading to fall 
injuries like twisted 
ankle or knee injuries 
5 
Insufficient 




Training  is 
provided to all 
personnel 





Fall from height (up 
to 2.6 meters), 
leading to fall 
injuries like twisted 



























cause of failure 
so that failure 














Fall from height (up 
to 2.6 meters), 
leading to fall 
injuries like twisted 
ankle or knee injuries 
5 
Slippery surfaces 
due to presence of 





crew (not an 
included 
process) 
6 60 162 
PFMECA.
83 
Slippage due to 




(detection is not 
readily done) 





Failure to loosen 
bleed valve due to 
worn valve grooves 
7 
Worn valve 
grooves due to 




crew (not an 
included 
process) 








Failure to loosen 
bleed valve due to 
overload failure of 
open ended wrench 
7 
Material stress 





crew (not an 
included 
process) 











from direct skin 




























cause of failure 
so that failure 














Failure to check 
















from direct skin 













Failure to loosen 
bleed valve due to 
worn valve grooves 
7 
Worn valve 
grooves due to 




crew (not an 
included 
process) 








due to material 
stress fatigue 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the wrench, the 
failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 
7 
Material stress 





crew (not an 
included 
process) 























cause of failure 
so that failure 









metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 




Failure to fit 
socket fully into 
the nut 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the wrench, the 
failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 











crew / section 
commander 
(not an included 
process) 























cause of failure 
so that failure 











Failure to fit 
socket fully into 
the nut 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the wrench, the 
failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 











(detection is not 
readily done) 
8 168 94 
PFMECA.
93 
Failure to fit 
socket fully into 
the nut 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the wrench, the 
7 
Inexperience 
leading to failure to 
detect error 























cause of failure 
so that failure 









failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 




Failure to fit 
socket fully into 
the nut 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the wrench, the 
failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 














































cause of failure 
so that failure 













too much force 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the wrench, the 
failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 




training leading to 































cause of failure 
so that failure 












too much force 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the wrench, the 
failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 



























head to shaft 
Failure of the 
sledgehammer due to 
the head being 
dislodged from the 





head to shaft due to 













head to shaft 
Failure of the 
sledgehammer due to 
the head being 
9 
Inexperience 
leading to failure to 
carry out 























cause of failure 
so that failure 









dislodged from the 







head to shaft 
Failure of the 
sledgehammer due to 
the head being 
dislodged from the 











(detection is not 
readily done) 





integrity of Drift 
Pin and/or 
socket  
Failure of the drift 
pin due to material 
stress defect, 
resulting in the 
shattering of the drift 




fatigue of drift pin 
and/or socket 
1 
This type of 
cause cannot be 
detected 
















and the swinging 
actions required. 
9 Negligence or overconfidence 4 
This type of 
cause cannot be 
detected 




















(detection is not 























cause of failure 
so that failure 






















































4 144 102 
PFMECA.
104 
Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 







sustained due to 
sledgehammer swing 
missing the drift pin 
and hitting 
somebody. 
9 Negligence or overconfidence 4 
This type of 
cause cannot be 
detected 























cause of failure 
so that failure 











Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 







sustained due to 
sledgehammer swing 
missing the drift pin 
and hitting 
somebody. 




(detection is not 
readily done) 
8 432 3 
PFMECA.
106 
Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 







sustained due to 
sledgehammer swing 









6 Nil 8 432 3 
PFMECA.
107 
Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 







sustained due to 
sledgehammer swing 











































cause of failure 
so that failure 
















Failure to keep 
clear of the 






leading to failure to 
recognize potential 
hazards 
2 Nil 8 144 102 
PFMECA.
109 
Slippage due to 




(detection is not 
readily done) 
5 10 194 
PFMECA.
110 
Slippage due to 




(detection is not 
readily done) 
5 10 194 
PFMECA.
111 
Slippage due to 




(detection is not 
readily done) 























cause of failure 
so that failure 













head to shaft 
Failure of the 
sledgehammer due to 
the head being 
dislodged from the 





head to shaft due to 













head to shaft 
Failure of the 
sledgehammer due to 
the head being 
dislodged from the 




leading to skipping 
the evaluation 
process 





head to shaft 
Failure of the 
sledgehammer due to 
the head being 
dislodged from the 




leading to ignoring 
observations 





head to shaft 
Failure of the 
sledgehammer due to 
the head being 
dislodged from the 




leading to failure to 
carry out 
evaluation 








sustained due to 
unfamiliarity with 
sledgehammer 
9 Negligence or overconfidence 4 
This type of 
cause cannot be 
detected 























cause of failure 
so that failure 































and the swinging 
actions required. 




(detection is not 
readily done) 





























































cause of failure 
so that failure 











Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 







sustained due to 
sledgehammer swing 
missing the drift pin 
and hitting 
somebody. 
9 Negligence or overconfidence 4 
This type of 
cause cannot be 
detected 
10 360 23 
PFMECA.
120 
Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 







sustained due to 
sledgehammer swing 
missing the drift pin 
and hitting 
somebody. 




(detection is not 
readily done) 
8 432 3 
PFMECA.
121 
Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 







sustained due to 
sledgehammer swing 






























cause of failure 
so that failure 











Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 







sustained due to 
sledgehammer swing 

























4 144 102 
PFMECA.
123 
Failure to keep 
clear of the 






leading to failure to 
recognize potential 
hazards 








Lack of training 
leading to wrong 
posture 
7 
Training  is 
provided to all 
personnel 






































cause of failure 
so that failure 





































causing skipping of 
steps 


















5 245 65 
PFMECA.
129 
Loss of grip on 
track links 
May result in crush 
injury when item fall 
onto personnel 8 
Lack of training on 
proper grip 7 
Training  is 
provided to all 
personnel 
1 56 167 
PFMECA.
130 
Loss of grip on 
track links 
May result in crush 
injury when item 
falls onto personnel 8 Not wearing PPE 7 
Manual checks 
prior to work 1 56 167 
PFMECA.
131 
Loss of grip on 
track links 
May result in crush 
injury when item 
falls onto personnel 8 
Time constraints 
leading to rushed 
actions and not 
ensuring proper 
grip 























cause of failure 
so that failure 











Loss of grip on 
track links 
May result in crush 
injury when item 
falls onto personnel 8 
Negligence or 
overconfidence 







5 280 45 
PFMECA.
133 
Loss of grip on 
track links 
May result in crush 
injury when item 
falls onto personnel 8 
Fatigue leading to 




6 288 43 
PFMECA.
134 
Loss of grip on 
track links 
May result in crush 
injury when item 
falls onto personnel 8 
Repetitive actions 









5 280 45 
PFMECA.
135 
Loss of grip on 
track links 
May result in crush 
injury when item 










5 280 45 
PFMECA.
136 
Failure to lift 
track links 
simultaneously 
uneven spread of 
weight may cause 
personnel to suffer 
back injuries, or lose 
grip on the item due 
to insufficient 
strength, leading to 
crush injuries 





























cause of failure 
so that failure 











Failure to lift 
track links 
simultaneously 
uneven spread of 
weight may cause 
personnel to suffer 
back injuries, or lose 
grip on the item due 
to insufficient 











5 200 80 
PFMECA.
138 
Failure to keep 
the trolley in 
place while 
loading  
Movement of trolley 
may cause improper 
placement of items, 
or uncontrolled 
movement of trolley. 
This may lead to 
crush injuries when 
item falls off the 
trolley, or collision 
injuries when trolley 
moves and hits 
personnel 






5 175 92 
PFMECA.
139 
Failure to keep 
the trolley in 
place while 
loading  
Movement of trolley 
may cause improper 
placement of items or 
uncontrolled 
movement of trolley. 
This may lead to 
crush injuries when 
item falls off the 





























cause of failure 
so that failure 









trolley, or collision 
injuries when trolley 




Failure of the 
trolley wheels 
due to wear and 
tear 
Jerky movements 
may lead to inability 
to control the trolley, 
resulting in risks of 
hitting personnel and 
causing items to fall 
off. This may lead to 
hit and/or crush 
injuries 






3 75 157 
PFMECA.
141 
Failure of the 
trolley wheels 
due to wear and 
tear 
Jerky movements 
may lead to inability 
to control the trolley, 
resulting in risks of 
hitting personnel and 
causing items to fall 
off. This may lead to 
hit and/or crush 
injuries 






3 60 162 
PFMECA.
142 
Failure of the 
trolley wheels 
due to wear and 
tear 
Jerky movements 
may lead to inability 
to control the trolley, 
resulting in risks of 
hitting personnel and 
causing items to fall 
5 Overloading 6 
Manual check 
by crew (relies 
on vigilance) 























cause of failure 
so that failure 









off. This may lead to 











ability to control 
trolley and its 
load 
Inability to control 
the trolley, resulting 
in risks of hitting 
personnel and 
causing items to fall 
off. This may lead to 
hit and/or crush 
injuries 
















ability to control 
trolley and its 
load 
Inability to control 
the trolley, resulting 
in risks of hitting 
personnel and 
causing items to fall 
off. This may lead to 




strength due to 
















Inability to control 
the trolley, resulting 
in risks of hitting 
personnel and 




























cause of failure 
so that failure 












ability to control 
trolley and its 
load 
causing items to fall 
off. This may lead to 





Failure to lift 
and adjust track 
shoe alignment 
in a controlled 
manner 
Lack of control over 
movement trajectory, 
leading to impact 




strength as a result 







5 175 92 
PFMECA.
147 
Failure to lift 
and adjust track 
shoe alignment 
in a controlled 
manner 
Lack of control over 
movement trajectory, 
leading to impact 
injuries or crush 
injuries 
5 
Using too much 
strength (judgment 








6 180 87 
PFMECA.
148 
Failure to lift 
and adjust track 
shoe alignment 
in a controlled 
manner 
Uneven spread of 
weight may cause 
personnel to suffer 
back injuries, or lose 
grip on the item due 
to insufficient 
strength, leading to 
crush injuries 










hammer head to 
shaft 
Failure of the 
hammer due to the 
head being dislodged 
from the shaft, as a 
8 
Loosely secured 
hammer head to 
shaft due to wear 





























cause of failure 
so that failure 















hammer head to 
shaft 
Failure of the 
hammer due to the 
head being dislodged 
from the shaft, as a 




leading to skipping 
the evaluation 
process 




hammer head to 
shaft 
Failure of the 
hammer due to the 
head being dislodged 
from the shaft, as a 




leading to ignoring 
observations 




hammer head to 
shaft 
Failure of the 
hammer due to the 
head being dislodged 
from the shaft, as a 




leading to failure to 
carry out 
evaluation 
6 Manual inspection 5 240 69 
PFMECA.
153 
Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
hammer due to 






sustained due to 
hammer swing 
missing the drift pin 
and hitting 
somebody. 
8 Negligence or overconfidence 4 
This type of 
cause cannot be 
detected 























cause of failure 
so that failure 











Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
hammer due to 






sustained due to 
hammer swing 











(detection is not 
readily done) 
8 384 13 
PFMECA.
155 
Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
hammer due to 






sustained due to 
hammer swing 











(detection is not 
readily done) 
8 384 13 
PFMECA.
156 
Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
hammer due to 






sustained due to 
hammer swing 













































cause of failure 
so that failure 



















Failure to loosen 
bleed valve due to 
overload failure of 




fatigue of Drive T-




crew (not an 
included 
process) 
7 56 167 
PFMECA.
158 
Failure to fit 
socket fully into 
the nut 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the wrench, the 
failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
8 
Time constraints 







crew / section 
commander 
(not an included 
process) 























cause of failure 
so that failure 









impact may cause 




Failure to fit 
socket fully into 
the nut 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the wrench, the 
failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 











(detection is not 
readily done) 
8 192 83 
PFMECA.
160 
Failure to fit 
socket fully into 
the nut 






leading to failure to 
detect error 























cause of failure 
so that failure 









leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the wrench, the 
failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 




Failure to fit 
socket fully into 
the nut 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the wrench, the 
failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 












































cause of failure 
so that failure 









suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 







too much force 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the wrench, the 
failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 
bruising, cuts, or 
fractures) 





























cause of failure 
so that failure 












too much force 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the wrench, the 
failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 




leading to rushed 
actions 




too much force 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 





































cause of failure 
so that failure 









failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 









165 Mark wrongly 
Torquing would 







Failure to use a 
calibrated 
torque wrench  
Nut not torqued to 
specified value 10 Negligence 2 
This type of 





Failure to use a 
calibrated 
torque wrench  
Nut not torqued to 
specified value 10 
Distractions 
leading to failure to 
check 
5 Nil 8 400 12
PFMECA.
168 
Failure to use a 
calibrated 
torque wrench  
Nut not torqued to 
specified value 10 
Time constraints 
leading to omission 
of checks 
6 Nil 8 480 1
PFMECA.
169 
Failure to use a 
calibrated 
torque wrench  
Nut not torqued to 
specified value 10 
Label too hard to 
read, leading to 
failure to check 
7 Nil 2 140 113
PFMECA.
170 
Failure to use a 
calibrated 
torque wrench  
Nut not torqued to 
specified value 10 
Insufficient 



























cause of failure 
so that failure 













Failure to gauge 
the range of 








leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the torque wrench, 
the failure of the 
torque wrench may 
cause his hand to 
swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 




leading to rushed 
actions 
4 
This type of 
cause cannot be 
detected 
10 280 45 
PFMECA.
172 
Failure to gauge 
the range of 








leading to impact 









(detection is not 
readily done) 























cause of failure 
so that failure 









person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the torque wrench, 
the failure of the 
torque wrench may 
cause his hand to 
swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 




Failure to gauge 
the range of 








leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
personnel is applying 
a lot of force behind 
the torque wrench, 
the failure of the 
torque wrench may 
cause his hand to 
swing and hit the 











































cause of failure 
so that failure 









suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 





Failure to check 
the correct 
position 









3 30 188 
PFMECA.
175 
Failure to insert 
track pin 
sufficiently deep 
to obtain stable 
and sufficient 
leverage 
Track pin may slip 
out during lifting 
process, causing the 
tracks to fall and hit 
the personnel, 
leading to abrasion, 










(detection is not 
readily done) 
8 336 29 
PFMECA.
176 
Failure to insert 
track pin 
sufficiently deep 
to obtain stable 
and sufficient 
leverage 
Track pin may slip 
out during lifting 
process, causing the 
tracks to fall and hit 
the personnel, 
leading to abrasion, 








































cause of failure 
so that failure 
















Failure to wait 






movements from the 
vehicle may cause 











5 90 135 
PFMECA.
178 
Failure to wait 






movements from the 
vehicle may cause 




leading to ETTO 
(skipping steps) 
4 
This type of 
cause cannot be 
detected 
10 360 23 
PFMECA.
179 
Failure to wait 






movements from the 
vehicle may cause 




training leading to 





(detection is not 
readily done) 























cause of failure 
so that failure 











Failure to wait 






movements from the 
vehicle may cause 






















4 144 102 
PFMECA.
181 




lifting the track 
links 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the torque wrench, 
the failure of the 
torque wrench may 
cause the personnel 


































cause of failure 
so that failure 









hit the metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 








lifting the track 
links 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the torque wrench, 
the failure of the 
torque wrench may 
cause the personnel 
to fall forward and 
hit the metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 
bruising, cuts, or 
fractures) 





























cause of failure 
so that failure 















lifting the track 
links 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the torque wrench, 
the failure of the 
torque wrench may 
cause the personnel 
to fall forward and 
hit the metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 
bruising, cuts, or 
fractures) 




(detection is not 
readily done) 
8 336 29 
PFMECA.
184 




lifting the track 
links 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 





































cause of failure 
so that failure 









the torque wrench, 
the failure of the 
torque wrench may 
cause the personnel 
to fall forward and 
hit the metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 











Failure to lift 
and place track 
on sprocket due 
to lack of 
coordination 
Personnel may get 
fingers caught in 
between the sprocket 
teeth and the track 
shoes’ slots, resulting 
in abrasion, bruises, 
cuts, or crush 
injuries. 






5 280 45 
PFMECA.
186 




lifting the track 
links 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 




(amongst the team 
propping up the 
track - which are 
the personnel 
holding the 






























cause of failure 
so that failure 









the torque wrench, 
the failure of the 
torque wrench may 
cause the personnel 
to fall forward and 
hit the metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 
bruising, cuts, or 
fractures) 
others at either side 






leverage due to 
vehicle moving 
too fast.  




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the torque wrench, 
the failure of the 
torque wrench may 
cause the personnel 
to fall forward and 
hit the metal tracks or 
suspension system or 








between the team 
propping up the 
track, the ground 































cause of failure 
so that failure 









vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 














5 60 162 
PFMECA.
189 




lifting the track 
links 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the torque wrench, 
the failure of the 
torque wrench may 
cause the personnel 
to fall forward and 
hit the metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 





(amongst the team 
propping up the 
track - which are 
the personnel 
holding the 
crowbar and two 
others at either side 































cause of failure 
so that failure 











Failure of track 
fixture due to 
worn thread 
lines resulting in 
lack of binding 
force. 
Sudden loss of 
tension may cause 
the track to snap 
forward and/or 
backward in a 
whiplash fashion, 









between the team 
propping up the 
track, and the 
















Failure to loosen 
bleed valve due to 
overload failure of 
open ended wrench 
7 
Material stress 





crew (not an 
included 
process) 
7 49 175 
PFMECA.
192 
Failure to have 
control over the 
tightening 
action due to 
sudden loss of 
traction with the 
track fixture nut 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the wrench, the 
failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 
7 Negligence or overconfidence 4 
This type of 
cause cannot be 
detected 























cause of failure 
so that failure 









metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 




Failure to have 
control over the 
tightening 
action due to 
sudden loss of 
traction with the 
track fixture nut 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the wrench, the 
failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 
bruising, cuts, or 
fractures) 




(detection is not 
readily done) 























cause of failure 
so that failure 











Failure to have 
control over the 
tightening 
action due to 
sudden loss of 
traction with the 
track fixture nut 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the wrench, the 
failure of the wrench 
may cause his hand 
to swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 






















4 112 123 
PFMECA.
195 
Failure to check 
the correct gap 
Too wide a gap, 
leading to inability to 
join track fixtures 




4 16 191 
PFMECA.
196 
Failure to insert 
drift pin 
sufficiently 
Loss of traction 
during hammering, 
leading to injuries 



























cause of failure 
so that failure 













over the pulling 
action due to 
sudden loss of 
proper grip by 
the crowbar on 
the track shoe 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the torque wrench, 
the failure of the 
torque wrench may 
cause the personnel 
to fall forward and 
hit the metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 





crowbar and track 
shoe leading to 
disengagement 






(detection is not 
readily done) 
8 112 123 
PFMECA.
198 
Failure to gauge 
the range of 
motion due to 
confined 
workspace 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 




leading to lack of 
caution 
4 
This type of 
cause cannot be 
detected 























cause of failure 
so that failure 









the torque wrench, 
the failure of the 
torque wrench may 
cause his hand to 
swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 




Failure to gauge 
the range of 
motion due to 
confined 
workspace 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the torque wrench, 
the failure of the 
torque wrench may 
cause his hand to 
swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
7 
Insufficient 






(detection is not 
readily done) 























cause of failure 
so that failure 









vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 




Failure to gauge 
the range of 
motion due to 
confined 
workspace 




leading to impact 
injuries (i.e., if a 
person is applying a 
lot of force behind 
the torque wrench, 
the failure of the 
torque wrench may 
cause his hand to 
swing and hit the 
metal tracks or 
suspension system or 
chassis of the 
vehicle. The hard 
impact may cause 


























Similarly, the top risks were consolidated and shown in the next two tables. Table 28 shows the operational activities and their 
PFMECA.ID, while Table 29 shows the corresponding failure causes and effects. 
Table 28.   Failure Modes with RPN Greater than 400, with PFMECA.ID 
Level 1 Operational Activities Level2 Operational Tasks Level3 Sub-tasks PFMECA.ID 
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut PFMECA.168 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.2 
Drive track pin partly 
free PFMECA.99 
2.0 Position Vehicle 2.3 Drive vehicle into position 2.3.5 Manipulate steering yokes PFMECA.64 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.2 
Drive track pin partly 
free PFMECA.102 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.2 
Drive track pin partly 
free PFMECA.105 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.2 
Drive track pin partly 
free PFMECA.106 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.8 Hit Shoe PFMECA.113 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.8 Hit Shoe PFMECA.117 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.8 Hit Shoe PFMECA.120 
3.0 Break Track 3.3 Remove track pin (USED track shoes) 3.3.8 Hit Shoe PFMECA.121 
8.0 Position Track (Initial) 8.2 Guide track over sprocket 8.2.2 Place track on sprocket PFMECA.179 
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Level 1 Operational Activities Level2 Operational Tasks Level3 Sub-tasks PFMECA.ID 
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut PFMECA.167 
 





























Failure to use a 
calibrated torque 
wrench  





leading to omission 
of checks 




head to shaft 
Failure of the 
sledgehammer 
due to the head 
being dislodged 
from the shaft, 











(detection is not 
readily done) 
7 441 2 
PFMECA.64 
Failure of 










execution as a result 







(detection is not 
readily done) 





















(detection is not 
readily done) 






































Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 







sustained due to 
sledgehammer 
swing missing 
the drift pin and 
hitting 
somebody. 




(detection is not 
readily done) 
8 432 3 
PFMECA.106 
Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 







sustained due to 
sledgehammer 
swing missing 





leading to rushed 
actions, causing 
misalignment errors 




head to shaft 
Failure of the 
sledgehammer 
due to the head 
being dislodged 
from the shaft, 




leading to skipping 
the evaluation 
process 



































and the swinging 
actions required 
Strain injuries 














(detection is not 
readily done) 
8 432 3 
PFMECA.120 
Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 







sustained due to 
sledgehammer 
swing missing 
the drift pin and 
hitting 
somebody. 




(detection is not 
readily done) 
8 432 3 
PFMECA.121 
Failure to hit 
drift pin with 
sledgehammer 







sustained due to 
sledgehammer 
swing missing 





































Failure to wait 




















(detection is not 
readily done) 
8 432 3 
PFMECA.167 
Failure to use a 
calibrated torque 
wrench  
Nut not torqued 
to specified 
value 
10 Distractions leading to failure to check 5 Nil 8 400 12 
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APPENDIX C.  HEART TECHNIQUE  
A. HEART TECHNIQUE 
This section lists the steps and reference tables required to execute the HEART 
technique. The bulk of this information, including reference tables and formulae, were 
extracted from NASA’s Human Reliability Methods—Selection Guidance for NASA 
Technical Report published in July 2006 (Chandler et al. 2006). 
The HEART technique provides a list of nine generic tasks for the analyst as a 
reference when assigning basic HEP, as shown in Table 30. Table 30 is coded with task 
categories in the leftmost column for reference in the subsequent analysis. 
Table 30.   PSFs used in HEART (Termed as EPC) and the Corresponding “Weight 




Generic Task Basic HEP 
5th–95th 
Percentile 
A Totally unfamiliar, performed at speed with no real idea of likely consequences 0.35 0.35–0.97 
B Shift or restore system to a new or original state on a single attempt without supervision or procedures 0.26 0.14–0.42 
C Complex task requiring high level of comprehension and skill 0.16 0.12–0.28 
D  Fairly simple task performed rapidly or given scant attention 0.09 0.06–0.13 
E Routine, highly-practiced, rapid task involving relatively low level of skill 0.02 7E-3–4.5E-2 
F Restore or shift a system to original or new state following procedures, with some checking 3.00E-03 8E-4–7E-3 
G 
Completely familiar, well-designed, highly practiced, 
routine task occurring several times per hour, performed 
to  highest possible standards, by highly-motivated, 
highly-trained and experienced person, totally aware of 
implications of failure, with time to correct potential 
error, but without the benefit of significant job aids 
4.00E-04 8E-5–9E-3 
H 
Respond correctly to system command even when there is 
an augmented or automated supervisory system providing 
accurate interpretation of system state 
2.00E-05 6E-6–9E-4 
I Miscellaneous task for which no description can be found 3.00E-02 8E-3–0.11 
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Table 31 shows the list of EPCs and their multiplicative weights to be referenced 
when modifying the basic HEPs. 
Table 31.   List of EPC and their Multiplicative Weights. Adapted from Chandler et al. 
(2006). 
EPC Multiplicative weight 
1 Unfamiliarity 17 
2 Time Shortage 11 
3 Low Signal/Noise ratio 10 
4 Features override allowed 9 
5 Spatial and functional incompatibility 8 
6 Model mismatch 8 
7 Irreversibility 8 
8 Channel Overload 6 
9 Technique unlearning 6 
10 Knowledge transfer 5.5 
11 Performance ambiguity 5 
12 Misperception of risk 4 
13 Poor feedback 4 
14 Delayed/incomplete feedback 4 
15 Inexperienced 3 
16 Improvised information 3 
17 Inadequate checking 3 
18 Objectives conflict 2.5 
19 No diversity 2.5 
20 Educational mismatch 2 
21 Dangerous Incentives 2 
22 Lack of exercise 1.8 
23 Unreliable instruments 1.5 
24 Absolute judgements 1.6 
25 Unclear allocation of function 1.6 
26 Progress tracking lack 1.4 
27 Physical capabilities 1.4 
28 Low meaning 1.4 
29 Emotional Stress 1.3 
30 Ill Health 1.2 
31 Low Morale 1.2 
32 Inconsistency of display 1.2 
33 Poor environment 1.15 
34a Low loading (1st half hour) 1.1 
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EPC Multiplicative weight 
34b Low Loading (each hour) 1.05 
35 Sleep cycle disruption  1.1 
36 Task pacing 1.06 
37 Supernumeraries 1 
38 Age 1.02 
According to NASA’s Human Reliability Methods—Selection Guidance for 
NASA Technical Report published in July 2006 (Chandler et al. 2006), the steps and 
formulae to conduct HEP assessment are as follow:  
1. For each identified task, match it to the most appropriate category of generic task
shown in Table 30. Assign the identified task with the associated basic HEP
value. It is important to note that these basic HEP values are only applicable when
the task is executed under ideal conditions. Therefore, the HEPs are adjusted
using steps 2 through 4 for realistic, non-ideal conditions.
2. For each identified task, select and all relevant Error-Producing Conditions
(EPCs) and their assigned weights from Table 31.
3. For each identified task, assess the significance of each EPC to the task and assign
a value ranging between 0 (best, positive) to 1 (worst, negative).
4. Generated the assessed effect using the following formula:
ܣݏݏ݁ݏݏ݁݀	ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ ൌ ሼሺܧܲܥ	ܯݑ݈݅ݐ݌݈݅݁ݎ െ 1ሻ	ሺܣݏݏ݁ݏݏ݁݀	ܲݎ݋݌݋ݎݐ݅݋݊	݋݂	ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐሻሽ ൅ 1 






B. WORKED HEART ANALYSIS 
Table 32 represents a template for the HEART worksheet, developed based on the steps described above: 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The author worked the HEART analysis and ranked them according to the probability of human error. Table 33 shows the 
fully worked analysis.  






























































































































































































Nil Nil D 0.09 Unfamiliarity 17 0.05 1.8 0.684288 HEART.1 9 





Nil Nil D 0.09 Time shortage 11 0.1 2 





Nil Nil D 0.09 Misperceptionof risks 4 0.2 1.6 































































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   





Nil Nil D 0.09 Inadequate checking 3 0.05 1.1       
1.0 Secure Area 1.2 Cordon off area Nil Nil E 0.02 Unfamiliarity 17 0.2 4.2 0.145824 HEART.2 24 
1.0 Secure Area 1.2 Cordon off area Nil Nil E 0.02 
Inexperienced 
Personnel 3 0.2 1.4       
1.0 Secure Area 1.2 Cordon off area Nil Nil E 0.02 Low meaning 1.4 0.6 1.24       






E 0.02 Unfamiliarity 17 0.1 2.6 0.389376 HEART.3 15 






































































































































































































E 0.02 InexperiencedPersonnel 3 0.1 1.2 






E 0.02 Inadequatechecking 3 0.1 1.2 






E 0.02 Misperceptionof risks 4 0.1 1.3 






D 0.09 Time shortage 11 0.05 1.5 0.377055 HEART.4 17 






D 0.09 Misperceptionof risks 4 0.3 1.9 






































































































































































































D 0.09 Dangerousincentives 2 0.05 1.05 






E 0.02 Time shortage 11 0.3 4 0.1344 HEART.5 25 






E 0.02 InexperiencedPersonnel 3 0.3 1.6 






E 0.02 Dangerousincentives 2 0.05 1.05 




horn E 0.01 
Inexperienced
Personnel 3 0.3 1.6 0.0164 HEART.6 35 




horn E 0.01 
Unreliable






























































































































































































Gear E 0.01 Time shortage 3 0.2 1.4 0.02296 HEART.7 34 




Gear E 0.01 
Inexperienced
Personnel 3 0.3 1.6 




Gear E 0.01 
Unreliable
instruments 1.5 0.05 1.025 






E 0.01 Unreliableinstruments 1.5 0.01 1.005 0.01005 HEART.8 39 






D 0.12 Unfamiliarity 17 0.05 1.8 0.5926284 HEART.9 12 






































































































































































































D 0.12 InexperiencedPersonnel 3 0.15 1.3 






D 0.12 Dangerousincentives 2 0.05 1.05 






D 0.12 Unreliableinstruments 1.5 0.01 1.005 





2.3.1 Release handbrake E 0.02 Time shortage 11 0.2 3 0.093324 HEART.10 30 





2.3.1 Release handbrake E 0.02 
Inexperienced
Personnel 3 0.2 1.4 





2.3.1 Release handbrake E 0.02 
Dangerous


























































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   





2.3.1 Release handbrake E 0.02 Low loading 1.1 0.1 1.01       










C 0.16 Time shortage 11 0.2 3 0.912083328 HEART.11 2 










C 0.16 Misperception of risks 4 0.1 1.3       










C 0.16 Inexperienced Personnel 3 0.1 1.2       










C 0.16 Inadequate checking 3 0.1 1.2       




































































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   










C 0.16 Low loading 1.1 0.1 1.01       









C 0.16 Time shortage 11 0.2 3 0.9030528 HEART.12 3 









C 0.16 Misperception of risks 4 0.1 1.3       









C 0.16 Inexperienced Personnel 3 0.1 1.2       









C 0.16 Inadequate checking 3 0.1 1.2       









































































































































































































E 0.01 InexperiencedPersonnel 3 0.3 1.6 0.0164 HEART.13 35 






E 0.01 Unreliableinstruments 1.5 0.05 1.025 







E 0.01 InexperiencedPersonnel 3 0.3 1.6 0.0164 HEART.14 35 







E 0.01 Unreliableinstruments 1.5 0.05 1.025 






E 0.02 Time shortage 11 0.3 4 0.1344 HEART.15 25 
































































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   






E 0.02 Dangerous incentives 2 0.05 1.05       






D 0.09 Time shortage 11 0.05 1.5 0.377055 HEART.16   






D 0.09 Misperception of risks 4 0.3 1.9       






D 0.09 Inadequate checking 3 0.2 1.4       






D 0.09 Dangerous incentives 2 0.05 1.05       






































































































































































































E 0.02 Time shortage 11 0.3 4 






E 0.02 InexperiencedPersonnel 3 0.1 1.2 






E 0.02 Inadequatechecking 3 0.1 1.2 






E 0.02 Misperceptionof risks 4 0.1 1.3 











E 0.01 InexperiencedPersonnel 3 0.01 1.02 0.0102 HEART.18 38 




3.2.1 Loosen bleed valve D 0.10 Unfamiliarity 17 0.01 1.16 
0.330930


























































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   




3.2.1 Loosen bleed valve D 0.10 Time shortage 11 0.1 2       




3.2.1 Loosen bleed valve D 0.10 
Misperception 
of risks 4 0.05 1.15       




3.2.1 Loosen bleed valve D 0.10 
Inexperienced 
Personnel 3 0.05 1.1       




3.2.1 Loosen bleed valve D 0.10 
Inadequate 
checking 3 0.05 1.1       




3.2.1 Loosen bleed valve D 0.10 
Unreliable 
instruments 1.5 0.01 1.005       




3.2.1 Loosen bleed valve D 0.10 
Physical 


























































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   




3.2.2 Check tension E 0.02 
Inexperienced 
Personnel 3 0.01 1.02 0.023664 HEART.20 33 




3.2.2 Check tension E 0.02 Unfamiliarity 17 0.01 1.16       








incentives 2 0.01 1.01 0.00040 HEART.21 46 










D 0.10 Unfamiliarity 17 0.01 1.16 0.332585638 HEART.22 19 














































































































































































































D 0.10 Misperceptionof risks 4 0.05 1.15 










D 0.10 InexperiencedPersonnel 3 0.05 1.1 










D 0.10 Inadequatechecking 3 0.05 1.1 














































































































































































































D 0.10 Physicalcapabilities 1.4 0.05 1.02 










D 0.10 Low loading 1.1 0.05 1.005 










D 0.12 Unfamiliarity 17 0.01 1.16 0.921991415 HEART.23 1 




































































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   










D 0.12 Misperception of risks 4 0.05 1.15       










D 0.12 Inexperienced Personnel 3 0.1 1.2       










D 0.12 Inadequate checking 3 0.05 1.1       














































































































































































































D 0.12 Physicalcapabilities 1.4 0.2 1.08 










D 0.12 Low loading 1.1 0.05 1.005 






3.3.3 RemoveDrift pin G 
0.000
4 Time shortage 11 0.05 1.5 0.0006 HEART.24 43 






3.3.5 RemoveDrift pin G 
0.000
































































































































































































3.3.7 RemoveDrift pin G 
0.000
4 Time shortage 11 0.05 1.5 0.0006 HEART.26 43 




5.2.1 Lift tracklinks D 0.12 Unfamiliarity 17 0.001 1.016 
0.888269
052 HEART.27 5 




5.2.1 Lift tracklinks D 0.12 Time shortage 11 0.3 4 




5.2.1 Lift tracklinks D 0.12 
Misperception
of risks 4 0.05 1.15 




5.2.1 Lift tracklinks D 0.12 
Inexperienced


























































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   




5.2.1 Lift track links D 0.12 
Inadequate 
checking 3 0.05 1.1       




5.2.1 Lift track links D 0.12 
Impoverished 
information 3 0.1 1.2       




5.2.1 Lift track links D 0.12 
Physical 
capabilities 1.4 0.2 1.08       




5.2.1 Lift track links D 0.12 Low loading 1.1 0.1 1.01       








D 0.09 Unfamiliarity 17 0.001 1.016 0.669532798 HEART.28 10 


































































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   








D 0.09 Misperception of risks 4 0.05 1.15       








D 0.09 Inexperienced Personnel 3 0.05 1.1       








D 0.09 Inadequate checking 3 0.05 1.1       








D 0.09 Impoverished information 3 0.1 1.2       








D 0.09 Unreliable instruments 1.5 0.01 1.005       


































































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   








D 0.09 Low loading 1.1 0.1 1.01       




6.3.1 Join two track links D 0.12 Unfamiliarity 17 0.001 1.016 
0.892710
397 HEART.29 4 




6.3.1 Join two track links D 0.12 Time shortage 11 0.3 4       




6.3.1 Join two track links D 0.12 
Misperception 
of risks 4 0.05 1.15       




6.3.1 Join two track links D 0.12 
Inexperienced 
Personnel 3 0.05 1.1       




6.3.1 Join two track links D 0.12 
Inadequate 


























































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   




6.3.1 Join two track links D 0.12 
Impoverished 
information 3 0.1 1.2       




6.3.1 Join two track links D 0.12 
Unreliable 
instruments 1.5 0.01 1.005       




6.3.1 Join two track links D 0.12 
Physical 
capabilities 1.4 0.2 1.08       




6.3.1 Join two track links D 0.12 Low loading 1.1 0.1 1.01       




6.3.2 Install Track pin D 0.09 Unfamiliarity 17 0.001 1.016 
0.564860
076 HEART.30 13 






























































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   




6.3.2 Install Track pin D 0.09 
Misperception 
of risks 4 0.04 1.12       




6.3.2 Install Track pin D 0.09 
Inexperienced 
Personnel 3 0.04 1.08       




6.3.2 Install Track pin D 0.09 
Inadequate 
checking 3 0.04 1.08       




6.3.2 Install Track pin D 0.09 
Unreliable 
instruments 1.5 0.01 1.005       




6.3.2 Install Track pin D 0.09 
Physical 
capabilities 1.4 0.01 1.004       






























































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   








D 0.10 Unfamiliarity 17 0.01 1.16 0.332585638 HEART.31 19 








D 0.10 Time shortage 11 0.1 2       








D 0.10 Misperception of risks 4 0.05 1.15       








D 0.10 Inexperienced Personnel 3 0.05 1.1       








D 0.10 Inadequate checking 3 0.05 1.1       


































































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   








D 0.10 Physical capabilities 1.4 0.05 1.02       








D 0.10 Low loading 1.1 0.05 1.005       




E 0.02 Inexperienced Personnel 3 0.05 1.1 0.0242 HEART.32 32 




E 0.02 Inadequate checking 3 0.05 1.1       
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut D 0.12 Unfamiliarity 17 0.01 1.16 
0.665612
64 HEART.33 11 


























































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut D 0.12 
Misperception 
of risks 4 0.05 1.15       
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut D 0.12 
Inexperienced 
Personnel 3 0.1 1.2       
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut D 0.12 
Inadequate 
checking 3 0.05 1.1       
6.0 Form Track 6.4 Torque nut 6.4.2 Torque nut D 0.12 
Unreliable 
























































































































































































































8.2.1 Insert track pin E 0.02 Time shortage 11 0.2 3 
0.103474










8.2.1 Insert track pin E 0.02 
Misperception 










8.2.1 Insert track pin E 0.02 
Inexperienced 










8.2.1 Insert track pin E 0.02 
Inadequate 










8.2.1 Insert track pin E 0.02 
Unreliable 




























































































































































































































































































D 0.13 Unreliable instruments 1.5 0.001 
1.000

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































D 0.13 Unreliable instruments 1.5 0.001 
1.000
























































































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   
11.0 







Nil Nil D 0.09 Unfamiliarity 17 0.001 1.016 0.190268352 HEART.38 22 
11.0 







Nil Nil D 0.09 Time shortage 11 0.1 2       
11.0 







Nil Nil D 0.09 Inexperienced Personnel 3 0.01 1.02       
11.0 

































































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   
11.0 












C 0.16 Unfamiliarity 17 0.05 1.8 0.81563001 HEART.39 8 
11.0 












C 0.16 Time shortage 11 0.1 2       
11.0 












C 0.16 Misperception of risks 4 0.01 1.03       
11.0 






































































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   
11.0 












C 0.16 Inadequate checking 3 0.04 1.08       
11.0 












C 0.16 Impoverished information 3 0.04 1.08       
11.0 












C 0.16 Unreliable instruments 1.5 0.001 
1.000
5       
11.0 






































































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   
11.0 












C 0.16 Low loading 1.1 0.1 1.01       
11.0 














D 0.09 Impoverished information 3 0.04 1.08 
0.097248
6 HEART.40 29 
11.0 














D 0.09 Unreliable instruments 1.5 0.001 
1.000
5       
11.0 






































































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   
11.0 












C 0.16 Time shortage 11 0.1 2       
11.0 












C 0.16 Misperception of risks 4 0.01 1.03       
11.0 












C 0.16 Inexperienced Personnel 3 0.04 1.08       
11.0 






































































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   
11.0 












C 0.16 Impoverished information 3 0.04 1.08       
11.0 












C 0.16 Unreliable instruments 1.5 0.001 
1.000
5       
11.0 












C 0.16 Physical capabilities 1.4 0.01 1.004       
11.0 






































































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   
11.0 








5 Check gap G 0.004 
Inexperienced 
Personnel 3 0.1 1.2 0.00528 HEART.42 41 
11.0 








5 Check gap G 0.004 
Inadequate 
checking 3 0.05 1.1       
11.0 












pin holes D 0.10 Unfamiliarity 17 0.001 1.016 
0.162008
297 HEART.43 23 
11.0 






































































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   
11.0 












pin holes D 0.10 
Misperception 
of risks 4 0.01 1.03       
11.0 












pin holes D 0.10 
Inexperienced 
Personnel 3 0.04 1.08       
11.0 












pin holes D 0.10 
Inadequate 
checking 3 0.04 1.08       
11.0 












pin holes D 0.10 
Impoverished 


























































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   
11.0 












pin holes D 0.10 
Unreliable 
instruments 1.5 0.001 
1.000
5       
11.0 












pin holes D 0.10 
Physical 
capabilities 1.4 0.01 1.004       
11.0 












pin holes D 0.10 Low loading 1.1 0.01 1.001       
11.0 












pin E 0.02 Time shortage 11 0.2 3 
0.103474


























































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   
11.0 












pin E 0.02 
Misperception 
of risks 4 0.1 1.3       
11.0 












pin E 0.02 
Inexperienced 
Personnel 3 0.1 1.2       
11.0 












pin E 0.02 
Inadequate 
checking 3 0.05 1.1       
11.0 












pin E 0.02 
Unreliable 


























































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   
11.0 















E 0.02 Impoverished information 3 0.5 2 
0.041828
904 HEART.45 31 
11.0 















E 0.02 Unreliable instruments 1.5 0.001 
1.000
5       
11.0 















E 0.02 Physical capabilities 1.4 0.1 1.04       
11.0 









































































































































































































3 Sub-tasks                   
11.0 

















APPENDIX D. CASE STUDY  
This appendix shows the case study of a workshop incident that took place while 
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